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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Palestinian Kufiyah Banned in Jordan

44040065 Nazareth AL-SINNARAH in Arabic
11 Mar 88 p 24

[Text] Some people arriving from Jordan have reported that Jordanian authorities have prevented citizens in 'Amman from using the Palestinian kufiyah while a large number of those citizens residing in Jordan have taken to wearing it as an expression of their solidarity with their brothers in the occupied territories. They mention that the Jordanian authorities have prohibited all printing houses in Jordan from publishing pamphlets that support the uprising.

Article Examines Difficulties Facing Attorneys in Gaza

44040132 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Feb 88 pp 29-30

[Text] In 1976, the General Assembly (the first session) elected the first Bar Association board, composed of:

- Fayiz Abu-Rahmah: chairman
- Faysal al-Husayni: secretary general
- Faraj al-Sharfa: member
- Yunis al-Jarru: member

Elections followed in the seven subsequent sessions, the most recent being the elections of 27 February 1987, when the following board members were elected:

- Fayiz Abu-Rahma: chairman
- Yunis al-Jarru: vice chairman
- 'Adil Khalifah: secretary general
- Muhammad al-Daryawi: treasurer
- Muhammad Hashim Abu-Sha'ban: member
- Salah-al-Din Abu-Zayd: member
- Muhammad Faraj al-Ghul: member

As of January 1988, 326 attorneys are members of the Bar Association in Gaza, including 23 women. Most of the members are full-time attorneys with private offices, while others have joined the convoys of workers in Israeli factories. Still others are employed by the government, and others work abroad (see Table 1).

Table 1
Distribution of Gaza Attorneys by Type of Work
January 1988

| Type of Work | Number |
|-----------------------|--------|
| Full-time | 154 |
| Working in Israel | 40 |
| Working independently | 36 |
| Employees | 32 |

Table 1
Distribution of Gaza Attorneys by Type of Work
January 1988

| | |
|----------------|-----|
| Working abroad | 35 |
| Not working | 27 |
| Imprisoned | 2 |
| Total | 326 |

From Table 1 we see that approximately 47.2 percent of the total number of attorneys (326) work full time as attorneys, which means that more than half of Gaza attorneys do not practice law. We also see that approximately 12.2 percent of the total work in Israeli factories. When we consider that 154 attorneys practice law, it is clear that approximately 26 percent of the total number of attorneys practicing law are workers in Israel.

The phenomenon of attorneys being workers in Israel deserves study and analysis. The Gaza Bar Association must give the subject its attention and try to apply and implement Article III of its by-laws, referred to above.

As stated in Article IV of the by-laws and internal regulations, members of the Bar Association are those attorneys listed in the Register of Active or Retired Attorneys who are residents of Gaza and who meet the qualifications specified in Barrister Act No. 32 of 1938.

Attorneys plead in various civil courts before Palestinian judges at specific times. Many cases may last several years before a judgment is handed down and final decisions issued by the court judges. (See Table 2 for current judges.)

Table 2
Palestinian Judges in Gaza Civil Courts
January 1988

| Conciliation Court | Central Court | Supreme Court |
|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Amin Wafi | Nadir al-Khandaqi | Jamil al-'Ayshi |
| Sami Saba | Muhammad Subh | Zuhayr al-Surani |
| Fawzi Abu-Watta | Khalil al-Shayyah | Fayiz al-Qudra |
| Abdallah 'Adwan | Yunis al-Agha | Muhammad Mahna |
| 'Adnan al-Zayn | Sa'ada al-Dajjani | 'Abd-Rabbuh Abu-Ma'liq |
| Husayn Abu-'Asi | | |
| Ishaq Mahna | | |
| Zakariya Kuhayl | | |

Citizens in Gaza cannot bring legal proceedings against the occupying authorities in the Gaza Supreme Court, but must go to the Israeli Supreme Court in Jerusalem. During the Egyptian administration, citizens could bring legal proceedings against the authorities in the Supreme Court of Justice in Gaza.

Committees of the Gaza Bar Association The Bar Association currently has several committees:

- The legal committee, chaired by Faysal al-Husayni
- The cultural committee, chaired by Yunis al-Jarru (later resigned)
- The social committee, chaired by 'Adil Khalifah
- The publications and scientific research committee, chaired by Fayiz Abu-Rahmah
- The attorney training committee, chaired by Muhammad Faraj al-Ghul
- The financial committee, chaired by Muhammad al-Daryuwii
- The prisoner defense committee, chaired by Muhammad Hasim Khayr-al-Din Abu-Sha'ban
- The athletics committee, chaired by Sami Janina
- The retirement fund committee.

Cultural Activities

We should remember that the Bar Association has issued a periodical cultural publication entitled AL-MUHAMUN. The first issue was published in May of 1985, the second in October of 1985 and the third and last in February of 1986. The Association has a library with 2570 volumes and references, including the 70-volume Arab Legislation encyclopedia, the 31-volume Encyclopedia Britannica, the 37-volume Russian Encyclopedia, the encyclopedia of Islam, the Simplified Arabic Encyclopedia, the Encyclopedia of Knowledge, the Palestinian Encyclopedia and many other volumes on literature, culture and science.

The Association also has a verification department, established in September of 1987 to verify all Association activities, everything published in local newspapers and magazines about Gaza and all studies on Gaza. In this regard, we remind our brothers in this department, as well as those on the cultural committee, that efforts should be intensified and unified to continue publication of AL-MUHAMUN and to provide reports that would enlighten the people on important, necessary matters and issues.

The Gaza Bar Association and its members, like others, face obstacles and problems that could prevent them from realizing some of their goals and aspirations. Samir Hasaniya, a member of the Bar Association, discusses these problems and obstacles with us:

"Attorneys in Gaza are going through an unprecedented period, one of the worst in their lives. A very large number of attorneys belong to the Bar Association, most of whom cannot find the appropriate positions they are striving for in their society, which itself is undergoing difficult economic circumstances which affect attorneys negatively. The attorney's effort begins from the moment he begins the training period, which lasts for an entire year without his receiving any material compensation to help support him or his family, if he is married. After he is licensed to practice law, the tortuous trip

begins. As an attorney, many things are expected of him. His family views him as able to work and support them, while he is faced with the bitter truth of many impediments and obstacles, some of which are:

- The large number of attorneys in Gaza practicing law and the scarcity and simplicity of cases brought to them, which results in low income for those working in this field.
- The fact that most litigants hire more experienced attorneys because they believe that they are better qualified to take legal action on their behalf and to defend them in their cases.
- A lack of trust in adjudication on the part of many people under the present circumstances, which makes them reluctant to seek a judgment, preferring family adjudication instead.
- The large number of middlemen in this field, particularly in road accident claims and compensation cases.
- The fact that many people engage Israeli attorneys, preferring them to Palestinian attorneys because they claim that they can operate better in the military courts.
- The lack of opportunity to hold government positions, despite the fact that many important government bureaus need legal departments.
- The lack of opportunity to work in Arab countries.

These are some of the difficulties faced by attorneys that prompt many of them to work inside the green line in positions lower than the position and profession of attorney or to do independent work totally removed from their legal work, both of which cause these attorneys great embarrassment and psychological stress. For this reason, we are forced to seek solutions to all or some of these problems in order to lessen the stress and difficulties. Some of these solutions are the responsibility of the Bar Association, some are the responsibility of the authorities and some are the responsibility of the litigants.

The Bar Association must continually press the municipal and village councils and private companies to use attorneys as full or part-time legal consultants and should try to get the embassies of Arab countries in Jordan or Egypt to make it possible for these attorneys to work in their countries. The authorities should make it possible for them to hold government jobs and fill the vacancies and shortages suffered by many government departments, particularly the office of the public prosecutor, the civil and religious courts and others.

"The greatest burden falls on the people to increase their awareness and to go directly in all their dealings to Gaza attorneys instead of middlemen. These attorneys are more qualified than anyone else to enforce a legal claim and to restore their rights."

Brother Samir Hasaniya talks about the most important problems faced by the Bar Association: "The Bar Association faces many problems and difficulties in carrying out the role with which it is entrusted and the duties which it must perform in order to protect its member attorneys and raise their professional and material standard. The first difficulty is the scarcity of financial resources that hinders any project to improve attorneys' circumstances. Another problem is that the Association board has no authority to discipline members. It is an Ottoman body subject to the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Interior in Gaza, and therefore, all the actual jurisdiction and authority of the Association are in the hands of the Law Council, which according to the relevant law has the authority to grant or revoke licenses to practice law and to monitor attorneys' conduct."

Many attorneys are demanding that the retirement fund stipulated in the Association by-laws be revived quickly and that the large returns from the fund be used to create and revive projects that would benefit all attorneys and guarantee their futures through pensions that will protect them from the ravages of time.

The Law Council

Prof. Rafiq Salini Abu-Dulfa, member of the Law Council, says: "The Law Council exists in accordance with Act No. 33 of 1938, which decrees that the council be established. The council is composed of government employees and others, with at least four members who are practicing attorneys. The public prosecutor serves as president of the council by virtue of his position. The term of membership is only three years, but reappointment is permitted. In accordance with this act, members of the Law Council are appointed by the British High Commissioner. Because of the circumstances in Gaza, during the Egyptian administration the High Commissioner's representative was the Administrative Governor General. During the occupation, the military governor in Gaza has replaced the High Commissioner. The Law Council is tasked with monitoring and overseeing attorneys in training and their tutors, granting licenses to practice law to attorneys who have completed their training and investigating the conduct of any attorney charged with deceitful practices or practices harming the legal profession or diminishing its value."

"If misconduct is proven, the Council may impose sanctions on the attorney, the most severe being suspension of his license for one or more periods, depending on the incident. The council also accepts complaints from citizens against attorneys, investigates the validity of such complaints and takes steps in accordance with the rules. Even if there is a complaint by one attorney against another, the Law Council takes steps in accordance with the rules. The only authority over the Law Council is the Law Council Act referred to and Barrister Act No. 32 of 1938. Decisions issued by the Law Council may be opposed before the Supreme Court of Justice in Gaza."

Prof. Faraj Bishara al-Sarraf, dean of attorneys in Gaza and former member of the Law Council, says: "I believe that the powers of the Bar Association and the Law Council are parallel. The Association still does not have any real power; it hasn't been able to compel or monitor attorneys or to execute its will over them. Giving all power to the state-controlled Law Council paralyzes the Bar Association's activity and function. For this reason, I believe that it would be best to abolish the Law Council and give its powers to the Bar Association, so that the letter would be the appropriate authority. When the Law Council was reorganized by the authorities and I wasn't a member, although I had served on the council more than 30 years it didn't matter to me because I felt that the council should be a part of the Bar Association, subordinate to it and free of dependency on the authorities. For this reason, I ask our brothers, the new members of the council to be intent on operating independently and on striving for the public welfare. I also ask them to always cooperate and exchange opinions with the Bar Association board so that the day will come when this matter can be completely reformed and the Bar Association given complete power, eliminating any need for the Law Council."

Finally, although we know that this report did not go into great detail regarding jurisprudence, the courts, the practice of law and its legal procedures or the litigants and the types of cases they bring, it does give a glimpse of the reality of the legal profession in Gaza. We hope that all scholars, concerned parties and attorneys will take an interest in the subject and conduct further studies and research into the subject of Palestinian jurisprudence in general.

9882/9738

National Action Command Leader Views Camps War, Uprising 44040142 Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 1 Mar 88 p 6

[Interview with Salah Salah, permanent secretary of the Palestinian National Labor Command in Lebanon; place and date not given]

[Text] The uprising in the occupied territory is controlled by a leadership based on an organized front. Its gains have been very great internationally, regionally, and in Lebanon. The war of the camps in Lebanon has ended, never to recur. The Palestinian-Syrian dialogue has paused to consider certain points of dispute. A meeting of the international conference remains unlikely.

This is what Salah Salah, permanent secretary of the Palestinian National Action Command in Lebanon, said to ORIENT PRESS.

[Question] There are people who say that the internal uprising has excluded Palestinians outside the occupied territory. What is your opinion about this?

[Answer] So that I may be of more help to you: many distortions of the uprising have been published. It has been said, for example, that the Americans are behind it because of the international conference; that the uprising is being led by fundamentalists; and that it has no connection to the PLO.

Many questions are being raised. Most of the time they are not based on sufficient information about the uprising. So I tell everyone who wants to write about the uprising to learn the truth about everything that surrounds it.

Five Organizations

[Question] In your opinion, what is this truth?

[Answer] The uprising is controlled by a leadership based on a front composed of five basic forces: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front, the Palestinian Communist Party, and Islamic Jihad. These five forces unite around the PLO's platform, which emphasizes the same slogans and goals as the PLO leadership: specifically, the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, an independent state, and return; recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; and solution of the Middle East problem in the framework of an international conference, in an earnest search for the achievement of peace in this region. The international conference should be based on the concept proposed by the Soviet Union, the originator of this proposal.

PLO Slogans

In addition to these political slogans derived from the PLO platform, there is agreement on a program comprising a number of slogans embodying demands such as repeal of the military government law, which the Israeli enemy has used as a basis for carrying out many forms of repression and terrorism from the beginning of the occupation until the present, such as arbitrary arrests, very long terms of imprisonment without charges, and the demolition of houses. There are also slogans demanding the abolition of the land confiscation law, which the Zionist enemy has used to date as a basis for confiscating more than 50 percent of the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, land which it has used for the building of settlements and the establishment of Zionist camps.

There are also slogans demanding repeal of all the unjust measures the Israeli authorities have taken to repress the uprising, such as deportation and wide-scale arrests that have included thousands of Palestinian children and inhabitants of the camps.

Leadership Outside the Territories

In addition to the internal leadership I have mentioned, there is a leadership composed of PLO groups outside the territories. These groups follow developments of the uprising within the country and work to carry out its needs in various political, informational, and material fields.

To give you more information about the uprising, I can tell you that we are very confident of the ability of this uprising to continue. This is due, on the one hand, to the level of organization, which includes all the Palestinian associations and camps, and, on the other hand, to the readiness of our masses to give without limit.

Undoubtedly, there are fundamental causes that give impetus to this state of mass opposition to the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The first of these causes is the reaction generated as a result of the occupation and all the accompanying degradation and oppression of the masses of our people.

History proves that the occupying force may be able to impose itself for a time, but that it cannot impose itself forever. The occupying enemy relies on the methods of repression, terrorism, and oppression to impose his presence; and such methods can only generate a contrary reaction that stores up suffering until it finds the right moment for an explosion. This right moment was born because of a number of factors that contributed to setting off the uprising at this particular time.

[Question] What are these factors?

[Answer]—The unification brought out by the Algiers conference.

—The war of the camps in Lebanon, with the psychological suffering it generated for our masses in the occupied territory.

—Proposals that aimed at liquidating the Palestinian national problem and thus provoked the nationalistic feelings of the members of our people: from the Camp David proposal for self-rule, to the functional distribution advocated and worked for by the parties in agreement with the Zionist entity.

Possibilities for Steadfastness

[Question] But what about the ability of this uprising to hold out in the face of oppressive Israeli actions?

[Answer] I am certain of the ability of the uprising to continue—for one important basic reason: our people's unlimited ability to give. True, because of the Israeli siege our people will suffer lack of food, medicine, and certain basic necessities; but they are capable of bearing and overcoming any problems. Before us lies a lesson we are still experiencing in Lebanon, where our camps were

subjected to a military siege aimed at starving them out, capricious arrests, and physical liquidations for 3 years, but were not defeated. Just as the masses in the camps in Lebanon remained steadfast for 3 years, the masses in the camps in the occupied territory are also capable of steadfastness. No one can predict what this uprising may produce, because it contains many surprises. For example, because of this uprising the siege of the camps in Lebanon was lifted. Because of this uprising a very important resolution was passed in the Security Council, recognizing the right of the Palestinian people, and condemning Israel as an occupying power.

Because of this uprising we can say that the policy of functional distribution has failed. All these things are certainly very important results. One can add to them the state of isolation being experienced by the Zionist entity, now that its reality as a fascist, racist regime has become evident.

The important thing is that the uprising has its own definite political and issue-related slogans, and that it is ready and able to continue until it realizes its slogans. I can say that the uprising has the ability to escalate its means of struggle to the level of civil disobedience, should the situation require it.

International Conference Unlikely

[Question] Some people are asking about the timing of the uprising in relation to such international and Arab political developments as the international conference, talk about a Palestinian government in exile, and other international developments, and the effect of the uprising on such moves.

[Answer] It appears that this question has come to be asked jointly by all journalists. The uprising has in fact shaken world public opinion, jolted the consciences of all peace-loving peoples, and created an overall atmosphere in which it is seen that peace and stability cannot exist in the Middle East unless a settlement of the region's central problem, the Palestinian problem, is reached. In the face of this overall atmosphere that has been generated, the idea of an international conference has also come to have widespread acceptance in international gatherings. Nevertheless, I think opportunities for holding an international conference remain remote. The fundamental reason for this is the disparity between two views of the goals and purposes of such a conference.

Along with the Soviet Union, we think the international conference must be held on the basis of mutual equivalence between participating powers, recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, and treatment of the PLO as the sole representative of this people. Israel, on the other hand, together with the United States, wants a pro forma international conference that will provide a

framework for direct bilateral negotiations on the basis of Resolution 242, which deals with the Palestinian people as if they were merely refugees needing humanitarian treatment.

Lessons of the Uprising

[Question] And on the Arab and Palestinian level?

[Answer] I believe—indeed I am absolutely certain—that the uprising has given the PLO a thrust it never obtained previously. The PLO's character as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and leader of its struggles has again been entrenched.

In addition, this uprising has given us a lesson we have to work out carefully, one about which we spoke a great deal theoretically in the past—I mean Palestinian national unity between all Palestinian factions without exception, regardless of their ideological and political differences. The logic of one group's having a veto over another group has to be abolished. We must take advantage of this uprising to deal with two basic problems in the priorities of the PLO: 1) improvement of Palestinian-Syrian relations; and 2) improvement of Palestinian-Lebanese national relations.

Palestinian-Syrian Dialogue

[Question] In the area of Palestinian-Syrian relations, what has come of the ongoing contacts?

[Answer] These contacts have paused to consider the Syrian letter delivered through intermediaries. The letter defines points of difference that require further discussion and examination, namely: 1) the Arab conflict with Zionism and Israel; 2) the position on Camp David; and 3) contacts with Israeli forces.

The Palestinian response to this letter was to express complete readiness to discuss these issues in a positive spirit in a meeting of Palestinian and Syrian delegations.

War of the Camps

[Question] The war of the camps has stopped, but the difficult task has begun—I mean restoring the relationship between the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples following this ocean of hostility, destruction, and blood.

[Answer] The end of the war of the camps and the lifting of the siege on the basis of the Amal Movement's decision announced by its head, Nabih Barri, have had very positive and satisfying effects for our people, not only in Lebanon, but also in the occupied territory and on the Arab and international level.

For this decision to have its full effect, we must remedy all the results of the war of the camps, by returning those who were forced to leave, by releasing those who were arrested, and by making passage through the Amal

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checkpoints in the south and the Biqa' easier. Even before all this, practical steps must be taken quickly to rebuild the camps and their surroundings.

After we finish with the war of the camps and its results, two basic tasks lie before us:

1. Laying political foundations for Palestinian-Lebanese nationalist relations, in view of the fact that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is a Lebanese nationalist presence, affecting all Lebanese nationalists: This is what Nabih Birri, the head of the Amal movement, affirmed in the meeting with the Palestinian resistance groups at which he announced his decision to end the war of the camps and lift the siege. The same thing was agreed to in the Algiers meetings between the Lebanese nationalist parties, including the Amal movement.

2. Restoring the relationship between our Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, especially the people of the south and those who live around the camps.

My assessment is that if this task is left to the Lebanese and Palestinian sons of our Arab people, they will be able to solve it; for they are a tolerant people who rise above the wounds and preserve their national and pan-Arab ties.

Ended, Never to Recur

[Question] Then we can say that the war of the camps has completely ended?

[Answer] I personally can say yes. The war of the camps between Amal and the Palestinians has ended, never to recur.

This time, unlike previously, I am optimistic, because I see that the factors that led to ending the war of the camps are the same factors that will assure that it does not break out again.

[Question] And the situation in East Sidon?

[Answer] I am satisfied with what Nabih Birri, the head of the Amal movement, proposed in the meeting with the Palestinian resistance groups when he announced his decision to end the war of the camps and lift the siege. He said, "Withdrawal from East Sidon is a subject involving complications and may be difficult at this time." I am satisfied with [his] wish that the road to the al-Tuffah region might be opened for the Palestinians. In response, we have made a decision to end any military movement in the al-Tuffah region and to withdraw any military positions located near the public highway.

The Camps and the Government

[Question] How do you interpret the return of the Lebanese government—the police—to the Beirut camps?

[Answer] This presence of the Lebanese government is a formal presence. We are concerned that the government's presence in the camps should be within the framework of a Palestinian agreement with the Lebanese government. This, in my opinion, is the reason behind the statement issued in Cyprus in the name of an official spokesman against the presence of police stations in the camps.

[Question] We still have to talk about aid and the reconstruction operation. How is aid reaching you? Are there Arab or international sources or plans for it?

[Answer] Two organizations have the resources to rebuild the camps and their surroundings:

The first is the PLO. In my capacity as permanent secretary of the Palestinian National Labor Command in Lebanon, I can say that the PLO has to date provided us with all the resources for repair that we have requested.

The second organization is the United Nations Relief Agency, UNRWA. I was a member of a PLO delegation that met in Geneva with the director of UNRWA, Mr Giacomelli, and with the team that works in the leadership of UNRWA. I have also met twice with the director of UNRWA in Lebanon.

[Question] What about aid from the Arab states?

[Answer] We here in Lebanon do not deal directly with the organizations, nor do we know the extent of their participation. The PLO leadership may know best how to answer the question about the extent of aid from the Arab countries.

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EGYPT

Report Discusses Increased Flow of Illegal Arms Into Upper Egypt
45040084a Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR 19 Feb 88 pp 33-35

[Article by 'Izzat Badawi]

[Excerpts] The latest General Security Department report points out that the unlicensed weapons seized since 1982 have come to 65,251 in number. These seized weapons include more than 1,800 machine guns and automatic and semi-automatic rifles. These are dangerous offensive weapons used in wars. Indeed, 8,561 weapons without licenses were seized, 60 percent of which were automatic weapons and cannons, in 1987 alone. In fact, the weapons which were seized last year, in an important political case which the office of the public prosecutor is investigating now, included a modern silent automatic gun which is considered the first of its kind in Egypt, one without equivalent in the country, because it is easy to carry and annihilates everyone at the site of the incident though no one hears its sound!

Weapons and Violence

From a rapid reading of the General Security Department report, we find that there is a strong connection between the spread of these dangerous weapons and crimes of violence, terrorism, and extremism, as well as felonies. In all the assassination attempts the country witnessed last year, rapid-fire automatic weapons were used; these are weapons which are greater than the ordinary armament capability of the guard personnel assigned to protect individuals who are assassination targets. Indeed, they have paralyzed their movement in challenging the terrorists. Also, the spread of political violence and crimes of premeditated murder have been accompanied by the spread of these dangerous weapons. While the country last year witnessed substantial activity by extremist groups in Asyut, Sawhaj and al-Minya, these three governorates recorded 50 percent of the total weapons seized in the country. The same share was seized in regard to the crimes of murder witnessed last year.

How have these dangerous weapons reached the heart of Upper Egypt? What is their source? What is the role of the security agencies in preventing their spread?

AL-MUSAWWAR made a tour of actual conditions in the heart of Upper Egypt to ascertain the source of these weapons and the cause for their spread.

It met with all parties, from the secret arms dealers to the senior persons responsible for security in the General Security Department. What did they say?

The Secrets of the Trade

The beginning was in a village of the district of Abu-Tij, Asyut Governorate, where the secret arms dealers who smuggle weapons to the Governorates of Asyut and Sawhaj are dispersed. After unremitting efforts, one of these dealers agreed to disclose the secrets of his trade, after I had promised him that I would not publish his name or photograph him, so that we could learn from him about this strange world related to the commerce of death and destruction, how they obtain these dangerous weapons and who his clients are.

He said, "The arms trade is a profitable one, especially in the Governorates of Asyut and Sawhaj, in view of the spread of crimes of revenge in these areas and the spread of extremist groups. Therefore, I took up this trade as a source of livelihood for myself, after I saw the arms dealers dispersed in the region realizing big profits through this trade. I began trading in weapons manufactured locally, then turned to purchasing modern weapons after the receptivity to them had become intense, especially automatic weapons, in view of each citizen's desire to own an automatic rifle or a machine gun so that he will not be less powerful than his rivals."

[Question] Where, though, do you get the automatic rifles you offer your clients?

[Answer] There are a number of sources from which we get automatic weapons. We smuggle them to the Governorates of Sawhaj, Qina, Asyut and al-Minya, where the demand for them has become intense, via trucks carrying vegetables, fruit, and other cargoes and also via the Eastern Desert from the Red Sea. All these weapons come from Sinai or the Governorates of Lower Egypt, because all these weapons have been smuggled from abroad, especially from Israel or from the leftovers of previous wars which Egypt waged, in addition to the weapons that are smuggled.

[Question] How much does an automatic weapon you sell to individuals cost?

[Answer] The costs of machine guns and automatic rifles vary according to their kind and level of quality. There is a 56 automatic rifle [as published; possibly either a type 56 Chinese rifle or a 5.56 mm Galil assault rifle], which is one of the highest quality automatic weapons; its price comes to 4,000 pounds. There is a light automatic rifle whose price comes to 1,800 pounds. The prices of guns also range from 700 pounds for a Port Said submachine gun to 7,000 pounds for a Brown anti-aircraft gun.

[Question] What do citizens do with an anti-aircraft gun?

[Answer] Some citizens ask for it as an instrument for self-aggrandizement among feuding families, and in order to be in a stronger position than their rivals or terrorize them.

[Question] How do you know when a search raid is in the offing?

[Answer] We offer services to the security men, and they know us well, because we procure the desired weapons from citizens so they can be handed over to them. Indeed, I am not hiding a "secret" from you if I tell you that some secret informants come to us, in the company of an arrested person from whom a weapon is being sought, and ask us to procure the weapon that is being sought so that he can be released.

What Does Security Say?

At the Akhmim police precinct in the Governorate of Sawhaj, where Col 'Abd-al-Mu'ti Nur-al-Din, the person in charge of the center, was carrying out a raid to seize unlicensed weapons scattered about among the people in the villages — in the course of which more than 150 weapons were collected from a single village — we had this meeting.

[Question] What are your methods for gathering up these weapons?

He said, "We have secret informants spread about in the various governorates belonging to the district, in addition to our secret sources who spell out the individuals owning unlicensed weapons and the type of these weapons for us. We get the permission of the prosecutor's office to search these individuals' homes and we seize these weapons which are in their possession.

"These raids in just 6 months have resulted in the seizure of more than 600 weapons without licenses, including about 25 guns and more than 100 rapid-fire automatic rifles, in addition to various other types of weapons."

[Question] How do these dangerous weapons find their way into the heart of Upper Egypt?

[Answer] These weapons are smuggled to Upper Egypt through some smuggling areas in the south of the valley, in addition to the weapons which found their way to individuals after the 1967 setback.

[Question] Doesn't the phenomenon of individual ownership of offensive combat weapons such as automatic rifles and guns constitute a great threat to security in the country?

[Answer] The situation has not yet become a phenomenon. However, the mere presence of a weapon of this type in the possession of any culprit threatens public security. Nonetheless, their weapons are not superior to those of general security, and we take them on constantly.

[Question] Do the police raids alone guarantee that this threat is challenged?

[Answer] We are currently stimulating the activities of the committees to effect reconciliation among feuding enemies in the various districts to limit the spread of these weapons.

[Question] Does the current law have loopholes that help the spread of these weapons?

[Answer] The current law guarantees the deterrence of these extremists, but by its nature it needs tightening. The law has made the possession of arms without licensing a felony, but in the event the weapon is of the rapid-fire or artillery type, it becomes a military felony. In any case it is to be noted that application is not a deterrent.

The General Security Director

We brought all these facts to Maj Gen Mamduh Bar'i, deputy minister of the interior and director of the security department, to learn the dimensions of this serious security issue from him. He said:

"The spread of these weapons about Upper Egypt specifically is something that has existed for a time, because the geography of the hilly countryside in these areas aids in the concealment of these weapons. They are also a phenomenon of self-aggrandizement and boasting among these individuals, and they spend their money buying and owning these weapons. They have a number of sources, by means of smuggling over the borders or smuggling locally!"

[Question] However, automatic weapons were used in all the terrorist operations last year.

[Answer] It is possible that these weapons could get into the hands of extremists, continually prompting us to seize them so that we can keep them from getting to these types of persons.

[Question] Arms merchants and individuals have pointed out that the arms delivery sites result in a brisk arms trade and the retention of basic weapons in the hands of the people who own them. What is your comment on that?

[Answer] There is no such thing as arms delivery. Rather, we conduct search raids in accordance with serious prior investigations and permission from the office of the public prosecutor, and we seize these weapons and the people who own them.

[Question] Which governorates of the republic are the most critical and have the greatest ownership of unlicensed weapons?

Brig Gen Tawfiq Jalal, director of statistics in the General Security Department, answered this question:

[Answer] If we look at the unlicensed weapons which were seized last year, we find that there were 8,561. Half of this quantity was seized in just four governorates, Asyut, Sawhaj, al-Minya and Qina. The weapons seized in these four governorates account for about 52 percent of the total weapons seized throughout the republic in 1987. There is no doubt that a firm connection exists between the spread of unlicensed weapons and the state of security in these governorates, since 50 percent of the crimes of murder committed last year occurred in these governorates, showing the extent of the serious nature of the existence and spread of weapons among individuals. However, one should observe that 25 percent of the crimes of murder in Egypt occur through the motive of revenge."

[Question] Is there a connection between the spread of unlicensed weapons and the spread of political violence in the governorates?

[Answer] To answer this question, one can observe the connection from the type of persons in whose possession these weapons are seized. In general, automatic weapons have been used in all the terrorist and extremist incidents.

[Question] How many automatic weapons were seized last year?

[Answer] Automatic weapons and machine guns account for about 6 percent of the total weapons seized in 1987, because most of the weapons seized are unrifled muskets or locally made rifles and revolvers. In 1986, 436 automatic and semi-automatic rifles and 211 machine guns were seized.

[Question] Do security efforts alone guarantee that the spread of these dangerous weapons will be challenged?

[Answer] In order for the security efforts in this area to meet with success, the masses' participating in and cooperating with these efforts is necessary, by giving notice about people owning these weapons, because if automatic weapons specifically are fired just for terrorism or self-assertion, that will result in the killing of innocent persons, because they are a dangerous weapon. Therefore there must be a balance between security efforts and participation by the people in the seizure of these dangerous weapons, because the nature of the geography in the areas of Upper Egypt specifically aids in the concealment of these weapons.

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ISRAEL

JORDAN

Crown Prince Discusses Unemployment, Censorship

45040134a Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR

16 Mar 88 pp 26-28

[Interview with Crown Prince al-Hasan by Yusuf al-Qa'id, date and place not given]

[Excerpts] If there is a single concern, we have the power over it." This is what Prince al-Hasan Ibn Talal, the crown prince of Jordan, said as he was emerging from a long meeting he held in the building of the Royal Jordanian Scientific Society. Before we began the conversation, his private secretary, Nasir Jawdah, reminded him that he had another meeting elsewhere.

Jordanian Issues

[Question] What characterizes domestic Jordanian activity now?

[Answer] This country shares the aspirations and the expertise of the peoples of the developing world, so that it will be possible to add a new dimension to the issue of cooperation with them. Jordan must also work to narrow the gap between the people who are ignored and the decisionmakers in its midst, if it wants to ensure the application of creative ideas in a manner whose consequences are guaranteed.

Jordan, in its capacity as a member of the developing world, believes that need requires that our places and our minds be cleansed of the dirt that clings to them, which has come to be known, colloquially, as obstacles of moral positions. We must consequently work to deepen our confidence in the ability of the other developing countries and to implant the foundations of our faith through mutual aid and mutual benefit.

Jordan has put its full confidence in the strategy of self-reliance and has adopted it as a platform for itself. It, it is truly said, is a strategy which has been characterized by authenticity, but has been lacking in help to strengthen it which issues from confidence, faith and social and national reciprocity.

[Question] How do you organize relations of contact with ordinary people?

[Answer] This morning I was in a discussion dealing with unemployment and pockets of poverty. I had spent last New Year's eve in a section called al-Wahdat, which is a section that brings together groups of refugees and some people who have come in from the Jordanian countryside. Direct contact took place in a coffee house. It had assumed the form of assertion on my part of the need to respond to individual requests, and when I moved over to meet with the representatives of social activities, I concentrated on the need to establish specialized offices in every suburb of the capital, to be known as citizen's guidance offices, which through the establishment of outlets for direct interaction would constitute the form of direct relations with the citizens.

For the sake of the continuity of discussion, we live with what is called petitioning. The petitioning might range from written requested demands presented to the visiting official, which contain all the citizen's aspirations and preoccupations, whether they are material requests or intellectual contributions, and the characterization might be applied spontaneously to me that I am a bureau of grievances. I try in reality to combine the traditional style, which takes me to visit the sections at the rate of a day and a half a week, at least, to try to reconcile direct contact and contact by voice through mutual accountability between the citizen and the agencies which have executive authority. There has been emphasis, on my part, on young people's role.

In this area, we will embark on the conversion of the Jordanian youth club and the university graduates' club to the establishment of the Arab youth club which will be another podium aimed at commingling the Jordanian experience with the graduates of dozens of universities in the Arab world.

The Margins of Freedom

[Question] To what scope does the margin of freedom granted to Jordan's writers and journalists extend?

In comparison with the situation in Egypt, for example?

[Answer] Sir, I believe in the creation of institutions. Indeed, when you ask about the margin of freedom, I answer your question with a question on the criterion. If the criterion is comparison with the countries of the third world, the margin here might be very broad, but when I talk about party commitment and people who work in their writings in the service of parties that are illegal in many other countries, I find myself faced with the basic dilemma. They are making publicity for the government agencies' security measures and at the same time they cannot be liberated from the intellectual commitment which arises from party affiliation and the statements in their writings, and that is the problem.

When we talk about the meetings of the Arab intellectual club here, in Amman, we are not sending invitations to persons according to their political or party affiliations; rather, we are addressing them so that they can take part in the dialogue.

[Question] In Jordan, however, there are some writers who have been prohibited from writing.

[Answer] They had been writing, but not under their signature, and they resumed writing under their signature. However, my hope regarding the building of institutions is great that the various professional groups will have the ability to begin the studies. We are in a transitional stage and therefore I believe in responsible freedom and absolute stands are by the nature of the case an easy matter.

The irresponsible demand for full freedom in the absence of the existence of institutions through which the attainment of legitimate demands, especially for the silent majority, can be exercised, can help drive young people toward extremism. I always have been a proponent of responsible, open dialogue.

Our problem is that we in the third world contradict one another for the sake of the appetite for criticism, for the sake of contrary positions, or for the sake of uttering slogans through which we attribute more boldness to ourselves.

Report Highlights Increase in Major Industrial Products

44040131b Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
1 Mar 88 p 6

[Text] Jordan's phosphate production last year increased markedly to 6,845,400 [metric] tons, compared with 6,249,200 tons of phosphate produced during 1986.

Thus it is evident that the increase in phosphate production last year amounted to 596,200 tons. Jordan's production of this material during last December amounted to 598,500 tons.

Potash

Official figures contained in the monthly statistical report issued by the Jordanian Central Bank indicate that Jordan's potash production rose last year to 1,203,200 tons, compared with 1,102,000 tons produced during 1986, for an increase of 101,200 tons. Jordan's potash production during last December amounted to 119,500 tons, compared with 107,600 tons produced during November.

Fodder

Jordan's fodder production last year amounted to 43,700 tons, as against 44,600 tons of fodder produced during 1986. This indicates a slight decrease in fodder production, amounting to 900 tons.

Cigarettes

The figures indicate that Jordan's cigarette production increased greatly during 1987, reaching 4,000,400,000 cigarettes, compared with 3,327,700,000 produced during 1986. Cigarette production thus increased by 672,700,000 cigarettes during 1987. Cigarette production during the last month of the past year amounted to 415,900,000 cigarettes, compared with 357,400,000 cigarettes produced during the preceding November.

Broadcloth

Jordan's broadcloth production during 1987 decreased to 1,958,000 yards, compared with 2,249,200 yards produced during 1986. Jordan's broadcloth production thus decreased by 291,200 yards.

Broadcloth production during last December amounted to 214,600 yards, compared with 168,900 yards produced during last November.

Thread

Jordan's thread production last year rose greatly, reaching 2,179.8 tons, compared with 987 tons, for an increase of 192.8 tons. Jordan's thread production during last December amounted to 205.9 tons, compared with 190.8 tons.

Fertilizers

Jordan's fertilizer production last year amounted to 604,000 tons, compared with 551,100 tons of fertilizers produced during 1986, for an increase of 52,900 tons. Jordan's fertilizer production during last December amounted to 55,700 tons, as against 48,000 tons produced during last November.

Chemical Acids

The statistics show that Jordan's production of chemical acids last year amounted to 1,103,200 tons, as against 1,024,800 tons of acids produced during 1986. Acid production thus increased by 78,400 tons during 1987.

Jordan's production of this material during last December amounted to 21,100 tons, compared with 111,100 tons produced during November.

Cement

Jordan's cement production realized a large increase last year, reaching 2,371,600 tons, as against 1,794,700 tons produced during 1986. Cement production thus rose by 596,200 tons last year.

Cement production during last December amounted to 155,200 tons, compared with 234,100 tons produced during last November.

Steel

Jordan's steel production last year amounted to 217,000 tons, compared with 209,600 tons produced during 1986, for an increase of 7,400 tons. Jordan's steel production during last December amounted to 24,300 tons, compared with 24,500 tons produced during November.

Metal Pipes

Jordan's metal pipe production last year increased to 18,500 tons, as against 12,500 tons produced during 1986, for an increase of 6,000 tons of pipes.

Metal pipe production during last December amounted to 2,200 tons, as against 2,000 tons produced during November.

Petroleum Products

The official figures gave Jordan's petroleum product production during 1987 as about 2,404,500 tons, compared with 2,257,100 tons produced during 1986. Petroleum product production thus increased by 147,400 tons from the previous year. Petroleum product production during last December amounted to 249,200 tons, as against 236,300 tons produced during last November.

Paper and Cardboard

Jordan's paper and cardboard production last year rose to 20,500 tons, compared with 15,100 tons of paper and cardboard produced during 1986.

Production of this material thus rose by 5,400 tons. Paper and cardboard production during December amounted to 1,800 tons, compared with 2,100 tons produced during last November.

Soap

Jordan's soap powder production last year amounted to 25,900 tons, compared with 28,100 tons produced during 1986, for a decrease of 2,200 tons. Production during December amounted to 2,000 tons, compared with 1,600 tons in November.

Upper Leather

Jordan's production of upper leather during 1987 amounted to 2,140,600 square feet, as against 2,393,100 square feet of upper leather produced during 1986, for a decrease of 252,200 square feet.

Production of this material during December amounted to 200,000 square feet, compared with 187,200 square feet in November.

Sole Leather and Wool

Jordan's sole leather and wool production during 1987 amounted to about 34.4 tons, as against 18.1 tons produced during 1986, for an increase of 16.3 tons. Production of this material during last December amounted to 700 kg, as against 2.3 tons produced during November.

Wet Batteries

Jordan's production of wet batteries during last year amounted to 54,400 batteries, compared with 55,700 wet batteries produced during 1986, for a slight decrease of 1,300 batteries. Production during last December amounted to 5,300 batteries, as against 5,800 batteries produced during last November.

Electricity

Jordan's electricity production rose greatly last year to 3,122,200,000 kilowatt-hours, as against 2,646,080,000 [probably a misprint for 2,646,800,000] kilowatt-hours produced during 1986, for an increase of 475,400,000 kilowatt-hours.

Jordan's electricity production during last December amounted to 226,000,000 kilowatt-hours, as against 256,200,000 kilowatt-hours produced during November.

KUWAIT

Investment Ventures in Spain Discussed 44040168b London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 23-29 Mar 88 p 38

[Text] The Spanish banks' confidence in Kuwaiti projects and investments has helped Kuwait score a new investment victory in Spain. After it had already bought more than 50 percent of the stock of Spain's Cruz Chemical Fertilizer Industry, Kuwait has now bought another part of the stock of Explosivos Rio Tinto Plants, one of Spain's biggest chemicals industry firms. Through the Kuwaiti Investment Bureau in London, Kuwait has even taken over the firm's management despite the opposition of its general director, Jose Maria (Escondor) Blas.

Kuwaiti investment has been able to score this victory by gaining the ownership of a large percentage of the stock of Torrest Hostench, a Spanish paper mill company which owns 24.9 percent of the stock of Explosivos Rio Tinto. The Kuwaiti Investment Bureau also owns stock in various other companies directly connected with the giant chemicals plants.

In addition to these shares that have enabled a representative of the Kuwaiti investors to fill the position of the company's deputy director general, two fundamental elements have surfaced at this level:

First, the majority of banks to which Explosivos is indebted have agreed to put their shares at the Kuwaitis' disposal, thus giving them more than 50 percent of the total voting rights. This is because the Spanish banks, led by Aresbank—the Arab-Spanish Bank—believe that only the Kuwaitis can put the firm back on its feet by virtue of their vast financial resources.

Second, the Spanish Ministry of Industry became extremely concerned with the future of one of the country's major factories which employs a large number of workers and thus recommended that Kuwaiti investment be encouraged behind the scenes.

By virtue of its new investments, Kuwait will try to merge Explosivos Rio Tinto Company with Cruz Company to improve both firms' performance and to enhance their profitability.

08494

Kuwait Petroleum Corporation's Annual Report Reviewed 44040168a Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 25 Mar 88 p 32

[Text] Despite the chaos characterizing oil prices in the past two years, despite the severe competition between producers and despite the adoption of an inundation policy which has led to a sharp decline of prices, the

Kuwait Petroleum Corporation has declared in its seventh annual report for fiscal year 1986-87 that it achieved tangible successes in its various activities. The KPC points out that thanks to the flexible policies it adopted, it has been able to produce financial results exceeding those achieved in previous periods. The corporation says that in the areas of refining and gas liquefaction, it was able to maintain high rates in exploiting the capacity of its three refineries and its two refineries in the Netherlands and Denmark, that it completed a number of projects on schedule, including the units and facilities for processing new derivatives in al-Ahmadi Port Refinery, and that it completed the first phase of modernizing the 'Abdallah Port Refinery.

As for international marketing activity, the corporation was able to maintain high rates in exploiting the refining capacity of its refineries in Kuwait and to supply its two refineries in Europe with Kuwaiti crude, in addition to meeting the needs of its traditional clients. In the area of marketing oil derivatives and oil gas, the KPC succeeded in entering new markets and concluding long-term contracts with a number of companies and countries. Exports of oil derivatives, gas and sulfur rose by 8.1 percent. In the area of petrochemicals, the fertilizer plants producing urea operated at their highest rate. The salt and chlorine plants also experienced an improvement, though to a lesser extent. The corporation points out that it has continued its joint international investments in cooperation with foreign firms, noting that the corporation's advanced facilities in Europe played a distinguished role in the international marketing activities and that these facilities expanded to include Britain and Denmark.

Concluding, the report notes that in the area of foreign oil prospecting, the KPC struck a delicate balance between the uncertain prevalent climate and its desire to expand in order to take advantage of the likely recovery by participating in new prospecting projects. Meanwhile, the KPC abandoned a number of concessions to consolidate its oil possessions in other areas.

08494

LEBANON

Fadlallah Views War On U.S. As 'Legitimate Self-Defense'

44040160b Beirut AL-'AHD in Arabic 11 Mar 88 p 10

[Interview with Hizballah Leader Shaykh Fadlallah; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Three years after Bi'r al-'Abd massacre, which missed its target and killed and wounded dozens of innocent people, what is your assessment of the current pattern of confrontation between the Islamic condition and the United States?

[Answer] Since the Islamic condition surged within the framework of the Islamic revolution led by Imam Khomeini in Iran and as a result of the actions of this condition, embodied in various revolutions in more than one Islamic country, especially in Lebanon, we notice that the United States has declared war on the active Islam that encourages the causes of freedom in the world and that acts to confront all international imperialist schemes aimed at putting pressure on the peoples' liberties, resources and decision-making.

This is why the U.S. intelligence agencies moved to assassinate more public figures whose activities these agencies consider to be a threat to their interests. These agencies have used various brutal means to achieve this end, including the explosion staged in Bi'r al-'Abd as a result of the U.S. schemes against those engaged in the active Islamic policy. That explosion claimed the lives of dozens of innocent women, children, old men and youths and exposed U.S. barbarism.

But the U.S. methods of confrontation has prompted the entire area to struggle against U.S. influence in the area because the United States spares no effort to achieve its objectives of striking the Islamic condition. Consequently, this condition is entitled to defend itself with all means and methods on the basis of the legitimacy of self-defense. The equation now is: It is either Islam or the United States in the area.

[Question] In your opinion, which has it been: The United States or Islam?

[Answer] We do not wish to make boastful emotional statements. However, we can say that Islam has succeeded in besieging numerous U.S. schemes in Lebanon and in harassing numerous U.S. steps in the area. We notice that the United States operates with all its agents and with all the means of political, security, military and economic pressure at its disposal to regain its previous positions through a different avenue and to confront active revolutionary Islam. The battle goes on with all means and methods. Islam continues to be strong in all its positions and the United States continues to make efforts to gain some positions to make up for other positions which it has lost.

[Question] The fact that the U.S. administration perpetrated a massacre against the innocent means, from the political perspective, that it has despaired of the possibility of a settlement with the Islamic condition in Lebanon. What degree has this despair reached now?

[Answer] The Islamic condition has provided no opportunity for dialogue or accord with the United States because it does not believe that the U.S. administration can make any real concessions in the interest of the area's peoples or in the interest of the Palestinian cause in particular. The United States holds the main responsibility for ousting the Palestinian people from their land and for giving Israel the power and the resources to

pressure the Palestinian people and the area's peoples which do not have the capabilities to confront Israel. Therefore, our problem with the U.S. policy is a generational problem. It is the problem of the present and future generations who will work to gain full strength in order to put pressure on every U.S. or imperialist influence. The coming phase is the phase of struggle—the phase of the great future that makes huge progress.

[Question] Do you see in Shultz' numerous recent tours a sign of this U.S. despair?

[Answer] We do not wish to discuss the U.S. issue in the area in terms of despair and hope. Rather, we want to discuss the long-range planning based on the long-drawn policy intended to control the area politically, economically and militarily so that if the United States fails in one position it may be able to work to transform this failure into success in another position. Therefore, the issue is how to carry out the plan to confront the U.S. policy and interests. We believe that world imperialism, led by the United States, has numerous alternative plans to achieve its objective. Consequently, we are also considering a plan to achieve our major objective of liberating the oppressed from U.S. and imperialist domination and of encouraging Islam to become the ruling force in life. Furthermore, we must have alternative plans in case any plan fails. Consequently, the word that embodies the real situation with the United States is the word 'struggle.'

[Question] Hizballah's investigation has proven and the U.S. media has revealed that other parties colluded in the massacre and that financial payments were made to ensure that the effects of the massacre on some regional parties colluding in the crime, especially Saudi Arabia, are removed. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Answer] In principle, the background to the Bi'r al-'Abd massacre did not surprise us. However, we were surprised by the details, considering that we had had no detailed information on the domestic and regional circumstances of the case. But through our studies and our review of the political and security arena, we realized that all the organs of the reactionary regimes that deal with the United States are closely tied to the U.S. intelligence agency. We consider these regimes' agencies a branch of the U.S. intelligence.

For example, we consider Lebanon's Deuxieme Bureau a branch of the U.S. intelligence in the area. The same goes for the Gulf, considering that we know that most, if not all, of the rulers of that area's countries cannot solve any security problem independently because the security issue is bigger than the kings and presidents. These countries' political agencies act as the arm with which the U.S. intelligence strikes and as the "treasury" which spends on numerous intelligence operations which the Congress does not agree to finance. A condition for keeping these rulers in power is that they keep their countries' monies in the service of the U.S. schemes.

Therefore, we were not surprised because we are aware that the strength of these regimes does not emanate from their peoples but from the intelligence services which controls them. The information published in the United States by the late William Casey, the ex-CIA director, confirms the nature of the relationship between the United States and "its colonies" in the Gulf and in the area.

[Question] The "determination" to confront world imperialism requires unified efforts and a stronger bond with the nation's leadership, embodied in Imam Khomeini. Do you see any new developments in this direction in both Lebanon and the Islamic world?

[Answer] I see no extraordinary development in this direction. I believe that we need a great effort and immense sacrifices before we achieve the Islamic front in the region and in the entire Islamic world to confront the ferocious imperialist onslaught on Islam's positions on all the political, security, freedom and justice issues. This is why we expect the Islamic peoples' movement to embrace the Islamic positions and to dictate its will to the Islamic leaderships and movements, as has happened in the Islamic uprising of Palestine which has been able to bring together many of the positions that were not close to each other in the past. We look forward to a great Islamic effort that will work to achieve the unity of Muslims under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, may God keep him.

[Question] On this third anniversary of Bi'r al-'Abd massacre, do you have a word you wish to address to the families of the martyrs who were killed in this massacre?

[Answer] I greet all these good, loyal and vigilant people who have reflected the highest level of Islamic awareness of the political issue which surrounded the circumstances of the massacre and who have opposed the U.S.-Israeli scheme which is embraced by all branches of the Lebanese regime and which is aided by the Gulf's reactionary regimes. This vigilance is reflected in the magnificent position taken by the women who were targeted by this massacre, keeping in mind that those women had just emerged from the Friday prayers in Imam al-Rida Mosque in Bi'r al-'Abd.

Many had wagered on the fall of the Islamic spirit among Muslim women. But we found on the Friday following the massacre that the number of women attending prayers was even greater. The demonstration which the women staged from the mosque to Rawdat al-Shahidayn drew attention and confirmed that a nation victimized by world imperialism cannot be defeated. I saw in the position taken by many faithful women miracles of Islamic vigilance and of strong will. This made me aware of my duty to complete the march to serve these faithful men and women who reflect the nation's bright image in this age.

We greet them with pride and condolences and with the faithful conviction that their martyrs are a part of the great Islamic caravan which started in Badr and which will not end until al-Imam al-Mahdi appears.

[Question] There are those who expect that another attempt will be made on your life next June. What is your opinion of this expectation?

[Answer] I have been prepared for martyrdom for 30 years and God has not granted it to me yet. Therefore, I tell whoever threatens in this manner: We do not fear death because we have put ourselves on the path surrounded by dangers. We will not retreat from this path and we will follow the example of our Imam Zayn-al-'Abidin who said: "It has become a habit for us to be murdered. Martyrdom is our gift from God."

A poet has said: If killed, as a Muslim I care not on which side of God I die.

08494

Al-Husayni Affirms That Crisis 'Is Over'

44040160a London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
25 Mar 88 p 15

[Article by Sharbil Zughayb]

[Text] At a hotel in West Beirut, Chamber of Deputies Speaker Husayn al-Husayni, a Maronite deputy and a Maronite economic figure who deals with politics occasionally met around a dinner table. The session lasted 4 hours and the discussion was greatly diverse. But the discussion focused mainly on the U.S. mediation between Beirut and Damascus, on the presidential reform paper and on the negative reactions to this paper.

At the outset of the discussion, Speaker al-Husayni stressed that Lebanon's crisis has ended finally and that he has assurances to this effect from the U.S. and Syrian sides.

In response to the assertion, al-Husayni's fellow deputy hailed questions upon him, asking: How could the crisis be over when your faction, mr speaker, has rejected everything in the presidential reform paper? Speaker al-Husayni answered confidently: This paper in itself and the reactions it has encountered are of no significance because President al-Jumayyil will amend the paper and, consequently, the internal factions will modify their positions accordingly.

The deputy asked anew: On what, Mr Speaker, do you base your optimism?

The speaker smiled, telling the interlocuter that the U.S. administration's movement is serious this time and that this administration is making mammoth efforts and, consequently, exerting great pressure on both sides, meaning President al-Jumayyil and Syria, to soften their

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positions and to emerge from the crisis with logical solutions acceptable to all—solutions developed at the expense and in the interest of all concerned, with disregard for the narrow transient and selfish interests of the local parties involved.

However, Speaker al-Husayni did not tell his two friends whether he was conveying the words of U.S. Envoy April Glasby or expressing his own conclusions on the U.S. position. But on the other hand, al-Husayni stressed that there is international accord, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union—the two superpowers—to end the regional problems hampering world peace. The two superpowers' agreement on the Afghanistan issue in their latest summit in Washington confirms that they will in their next summit, scheduled to be held in Moscow next June, tackle the Middle East area problems.

Speaker al-Husayni said that the political players must learn to read well the international changes which totally reflect on domestic and regional conditions.

Responding to a question on the special relationship between Lebanon and Syria, Speaker al-Husayni said that Lebanon, like Syria and the other Arab countries, is a member of the Arab League. But within this league, does Lebanon view Syria as it views Djibouti, Yemen or any other Arab country remote from its borders? Answering his own question, he said: Of course not, because Syria is the neighbor closest to Lebanon and because it has joint borders with Lebanon. Throughout the ages, Lebanon has viewed Syria differently from the other Arab countries. This means that the relationship between Lebanon and Syria is special, though surrounded by certain ambiguities, not problems. It is easy to eliminate these ambiguities, especially those concerning the army and foreign policy, through understanding. In other areas, there is no place for problems because Lebanon is the beneficiary of the special relations. Free economy is always more successful than guided economy. All in Syria and Lebanon acknowledge the freedom of private education. This means protecting all the ethnic groups in both countries.

At the end of the discussion, Speaker al-Husayni turned to his friends and said: "Believe me, brothers, 'it is over' and Lebanon will be restored to a better condition than in the past. He who does not learn from the past will not read the future well."

In response, the deputy asked al-Husayni: How could it be over, Mr Speaker, when conditions are changing from bad to worse? How could you ask President al-Jumayyil to make concessions 6 months before the end of his term when he has made no concession throughout the past 6 years, when he aspires to become the Christians' patriarch at the end of his term, considering that he aspires to become chairman of the Phalange Party and of the Lebanese Front and commander of the Lebanese Forces, and when he is thinking of becoming Camille Sham'un

and Pierre al-Jumayyil, all in one? He is not prepared to capitulate to any pressure from any source whatsoever. Neither the United States nor Syria can force him to sign to any concessions. Moreover, how can Syria, which has not abandoned for a single moment since al-Jumayyil's first summit with President al-Asad any of the demands it has made on al-Jumayyil, make concessions to al-Jumayyil now? Syria prefers to make such concessions to the next president so that it may present itself as a party that facilitates the new president's mission and that does not obstruct the course of reform in Lebanon and so that it may depict President al-Jumayyil as the sole obstacle in the path of reuniting Lebanon and developing its system?

But Speaker al-Husayni rejected this analysis in its entirety, telling his colleague: "Believe me it is over because the Americans are serious this time."

At another level, Michel Iddih, a former cabinet minister, has confirmed that the United States is truly serious in its effort to end the crisis but that no positive developments have yet emerged and that, so far, matters have not crystallized. He added that we have to wait till next June to distinguish between black and white.

It is worth noting that Iddih maintains special relations with Ambassador April Glasby. Moreover, most of the politicians who have relations with the U.S. Embassy in Beirut assert that Gallaspay's visit has produced no positive results whereas politicians close to Damascus stress the contrary, saying that Gallaspay's participation in the Murphy-Shultz visits to the area, and to Syria in particular, is not incidental and not for the purpose of entertainment but is on the basis of a serious effort being made by the United States to end Lebanon's crisis. Glasby has good relations with President Hafiz al-Asad. This has been confirmed in Washington by General Walters, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who noticed that President al-Asad was impressed by Glasby when she accompanied him on his latest visit to Damascus. Glasby's visit to Damascus means that Syrian-U.S. negotiations have reached the depth they must reach and that the issue is no longer confined to the framework of just the Lebanese-Syrian relations but also includes the framework of the Lebanese-Israeli relations. An East Beirut leader has said that Glasby's talks with Lebanese and Syrian officials dealt mainly with the issue of South Lebanon in its entirety, especially the questions of security arrangements between Israel and Lebanon and of Syria's guarantees for such arrangements. If Glasby reaches concrete results on the issue of arrangements in the South, this area may see Israel take certain military steps in the next two months. Such steps may be followed by an emergency UN Security Council meeting which issues a resolution denouncing Israel and asking it to fully withdraw from all Lebanese territories and another resolution increasing the number and powers of the UN emergency forces in the entire South, especially on the Lebanese-Israeli forces. This leader has said that

Israel will observe the Security Council resolutions this time, will withdraw from the South before the next presidential elections and will abandon its support for the South Lebanon Army.

Those who hold this opinion add that it is from this point that Dean Iddih proceeds in his presidential campaign because he is aware of the hidden secrets of the political game being currently played in the Middle East, especially in South Lebanon. They also say that when he demands Israel's withdrawal before he agrees to take over his constitutional powers, Iddih is not "fleeing," as some people charge. Rather, Iddih is aware of the true nature of the U.S. initiative which is supported by the Vatican and approved by Bkarki, considering that Patriarch Sufayr offers Dean Iddih's name openly whenever there is talk about the presidency. When the dean says that he will need the Syrian army for a time after he assumes his constitutional powers, then it means that he has not changed his position toward the Syrian army. Rather, all contacts with Iddih move in this direction. Speaker al-Husayni is perhaps not "hallucinating" when he says "believe me, brothers, it is over."

At the level of reforms, the U.S. diplomats in Beirut, especially Daniel Simpson, the U.S. Embassy's political adviser, assert that the United States is serious in its efforts to develop common factors among the Lebanese themselves and among the Lebanese and the Syrians, that the question of a special relationship between Lebanon and Syria is a foregone conclusion, that the holding of presidential elections according to the constitutional timetable is also a foregone conclusion, that Lebanon will have a new president, that the United States has not and will not approve a two-year extension or a full-term extension for Amin al-Jumayyil, the current president, and that al-Jumayyil was informed of this fact long ago. In all his visits to the politicians, Simpson does not ask them for their opinion on the reforms that are being discussed but rather asks them not to oppose these reforms when they are presented, stressing that no liberties, be they political, economic, informational or educational, will be undermined.

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Study Explores Problems, Positive Indications of Economy

44000056a Limassol MEMO in English
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[Article by Dr. Talhat Yaffi]

[Text] At the end of 1987 the economic situation of Lebanon seemed far better than four months earlier. Exchange reserves were mounting up slowly, inflation receded to its lowest cited figure last December, industries were exporting all they could and have contracts to fulfill for five years, and Lebanese working and living abroad returned in great numbers and some chose to stay and explore future prospects.

The outcome of all these indications came out in the stabilization of the Lebanese Pound at less than £500 to the dollar, in spite of the falling of this exchange rate nearer to £700 to the dollar few weeks earlier.

What are the reasons behind these apparently better prospects? Are the causes durable? How can the Lebanese improve chances of success in overcoming economic, political and social difficulties? This article tries to provide answers about the premises for optimism, and possibilities for improving the odds of success. The writer believes that prospects are improving, and that this long awaited opportunity should not be aborted. Still, it is important to single out the most adverse features of 1987 and their impact on the economy, in order to project how to overcome their consequences.

1987: The bad points

Over the twelve months of 1987, and despite relative calm between Lebanese armed factions, the exchange value of the Lebanese Pound fell to one fifth of what it was at the end of 86. On 31.12.1986 the exchange value of the Lebanese Pound was £87 to the dollar and after one year it had dropped to £452, or to 19.3 percent of its value twelve months before. Most of the drop had materialized in the summer months, as the Lebanese Pound exchanged to the dollar at less than 100 as late as June, 1987.

Inflation increased rapidly for a number of reasons and necessitated a practical doubling of salaries by 1.7.87 which further contributed to fuel inflationary forces. The budget deficit, which has been a major cause of inflation, was pushed higher and is estimated to have reached £120 billion in 1987, which figure equals the total internal debt accumulated since 1983 and until end 1986.

By November the General Confederation of Labour had to call for an open strike intended to emphasize the need for measures to stop inflation and improve the exchange value of the Lebanese Pound. The strike folded after three days, but it seemed to have brought a message home. Since then the Lebanese Pound has improved its exchange value and the rate of inflationary increases slowed down last December to the lowest monthly figure in two years.

Inflation and mounting public debt led in turn to two negative developments. On the one hand labour are asking for salary increases, since 1.7.1987 at the rate of 300 percent to compensate for cost of living increases, and on the other hand the Social Security, Health Services and Termination of Employment Funds are practically bankrupt.

Any increase of wages and salaries in the percentages claimed would send the Lebanese Pound tumbling and fuel inflation beyond acceptable limits. In fact such an increase will cause many industrial establishments to close down, and will certainly threaten the ability of the

banking sector to continue functioning without massive release of personnel. By contrast, the social security problems are by their nature long term, although their impact has become clearer as more and more of the insured, who constitute one third of the working Lebanese, are failing to secure their promised benefits.

Against this background of negative developments in 1987 it is perfectly justified to ask: where are the positive signs and how have these come about in the prevailing circumstances?

Signs of hope

The clearest sign of hope has been the absence of widespread fighting between Lebanese political groups, and a broadening moderation in political statements. Traditional political positions are not being called into question, although political and administrative reforms are considered pressing.

In a year of relative military tranquillity, and in spite of a boycott by some government members, of the President, most urgent issues could be handled and the Lebanese machinery of government continued functioning, although at barely acceptable levels of performance. Private sector activities proceeded at a better pace. Joint ventures functioned between Lebanese of different groups, and religious and personal considerations, were overcome, when it was considered necessary to achieve beneficial arrangements. The flow of goods and people between different regions of Lebanon was greater and more diversified than in 1986.

Social and religious movements which attempted to help needy Lebanese and to partly substitute for the government in health and educational services, demonstrated an unexpected measure of social solidarity. Moreover, the Lebanese, long considered frivolous and overly motivated by personal gain, are showing in providing help to relatives and friends, that their generosity is not restricted to showing off only.

In addition to these social factors which introduced positive signs into the Lebanese economic and social scene there has been an imperceptible development of great consequence. Middle aged well to do, not super-rich Lebanese, have grown tired of working in the oil rich countries, and living abroad. They wanted to return to Lebanon, provided there was peace, tolerance for co-existence, and acceptable, if not good schools. This group of Lebanese had stayed cohesive during the war years, and through visits, small investments, and new enterprises, have begun to have a positive impact as of 1987. They could well herald the return of Lebanon of most of those who emigrated during the war years, and who are estimated at 1 million, split evenly between Muslims and Christians.

Imports and exports

Lebanon, before the war started in 1975 used to import much more than it exported. In the early seventies, industrial exports increased at a rapid rate, but their proportion to total imports was still small, let alone that the import content of exports was and remains high. However, the trade gap was always more than covered by income from services, tourism, transfers from Lebanese workers employed in oil rich countries, and other invisible earnings. In fact such surpluses strengthened the Lebanese Pound beyond its fundamental strength, and measures were adopted to weaken its over-valuation in the early seventies.

Today, we are at the other extremity of the spectrum. The Lebanese Pound is undervalued and showing continual weakness, except for the last two months, and our task is to stabilize and improve the value of the Pound, in order to regain faith in its stability, by the Lebanese first, and later by Arab and foreign investors.

Our balance of payments is in surplus. Exchange reserves of the Central Bank and the public sector have increased by US\$ 300 million in three months, and deposits in foreign exchange by the Lebanese in Lebanon have remained stable. All this happened whilst Lebanese private deposits abroad continued to increase as per statistics of the Bank of International Settlements, and hence there is not doubt that our balance of payments has been in surplus.

During the war years the structure of our imports has changed. In 1983 for example we imported US\$ 3.7 billion worth of products. Possibly, as much as US\$ 700 million of goods were re-exported profitably to Syria and Turkey. However in that year our balance of payments showed a deficit of US\$ 1100 million, and our reserves fell by as much.

Last year, various estimates indicate that our imports did not exceed US\$ 1 billion. In particular our oil and fuel imports were around US\$ 420 million as opposed to over US\$ 1 billion in 83. Had our earnings through transfers, tourism and invisible services been as in 1983 our balance of payments surplus could have exceeded US\$ 1 billion. But, as our imports have changed and diminished, so have transfers by Lebanese from oil rich countries, which are now around 35-40 million dollars/month as opposed to US\$ 200 million/month in 82/83. Visits by Lebanese living abroad who spend foreign currency like tourists perhaps accounted for US\$ 50-60 million over the year. Other visitors are insignificant in number.

The difference between our import bill and our earnings of foreign exchange is largely accounted for by exports estimated at over US\$ 320 million, inflow of aid estimated to various groups at around US\$ 20 million/month or US\$ 240 million/year, the transfers noted above and invisible earnings of some US\$ 500 million,

which have allowed a continuous capital outflow from Lebanon and a residual surplus on the balance of payments account of some US\$ 200 million. Also, it should be noted that Lebanese depositors with US\$ 3.2 billion worth of deposits in foreign currencies earn at least the equivalent of US\$ 200 million/year on these moneys.

Making the pound stronger

Assuming a balance of payments surplus making the Pound stronger is the first step toward controlling inflation and regaining faith in the future of the Lebanese economy. That objective can be achieved as has been indicated from a twenty percent improvement in the exchange value of the Pound from December to end January.

The result was achieved in consequence of two developments. In the first place fuel and oil products prices were increased on average by 130 percent in one go in December 1987.

That decision in itself meant that £70 billion/year would go to the government towards reducing its budgetary deficit estimated to equal £120 billion in 1987. Consequently, the impact of this drastic, and yet simple move, was a dramatic improvement in the exchange value of the Pound, and dramatic reduction in the inflation rate.

Together with this move there was a palpable feeling that Lebanon is heading towards better days. Lebanese began to invest, in property, small industries, services companies etc. The mood changed, from depression to better expectations, and 1988 seemed less frightening than few months before. Even discussion of the use of Lebanon's gold reserves receded as liquid reserves improved. Yet it is important that these gold reserves are there, although their paper value fell from December till now (February 10, 1987) by US\$ 500 million, i.e. more than our total liquid reserves.

If the exchange value of the Lebanese Pound continues to improve and inflation falls significantly, it is virtually certain that many Lebanese will revert their deposits again to Lebanese Pounds. At current rates of interest on discounted treasury bills anyone who exchanged dollars to lebanese Pounds two months ago and purchased treasury bills, has made a killing. However, all these could be wiped out if salary and wage increases are granted at near demands made.

The dilemma of wages and salaries

Labour are demanding a 300 percent wages and salaries increase retroactive to 1.7.1987. They base their demands on cost of living figures that have reflected the prices of October-November when the exchange rate hovered over £600 and was about to exceed £700 to the Dollar. That experience urged traders to price their goods in foreign exchange and professionals to triple

their charges in Lebanese Pound. The stampede, however, was over as of the time periods of oil products were increased to cover their real costs, and the biggest hemorrhage of public funds was strongly reduced. There remains the question of electricity. More than 80 percent of total consumption is not paid for and 90 percent of all electricity is generated in thermal stations burning expensive imported fuel oil.

The trouble is that consequences of a stabilized Pound on general price levels need time to materialize, and labour unions desperately need higher wages to sustain much lower standards of living. Already, some prices have started falling, such as gasoline and gaz prices, prices of food, and general consumers items. These beginnings are not yet so widespread and prevalent as to paint a totally different canvas.

It is precisely at this point in time that the government needs to convey its ability and intention to provide social, health and educational services. If it were able to do so, there is evidence that labour demands can be moderated. But the government has to act as a body with a common objective, to give conviction and devise programs.

The prime minister has suggested that a period of truce should prevail to allow leaders to work on a social and economic program designed to finally improve standards of living, and not only to slow the slide that has eaten away the standards of living of the Lebanese.

Today, there is no doubt that all the Lebanese want peace, co-existence and economic improvement. Efforts to this end will be welcomed by most of the population, and there is still hope, after 13 years of destruction, of a rejuvenation of the economy and Lebanese society.

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Interview Gives Profile of 'Undeclared Presidential Candidate'

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[Text] A thoughtful man of well-chosen words, modest in his pride but sure of himself and his stands, a firm Maronite who, in accordance with the teachings of Christ, loves his Moslem brother and shares with him the "loaf of nationalism"—such is economist Henri Sfeir, who gave MONDAY MORNING an interview last week.

Sfeir, holding tenaciously to his Arabism, opposed to Israel and the agents who collaborate with it, and viewing with realism the need for interaction with Syria amidst due respect for independence and sovereignty, is an undeclared candidate for the Lebanese presidency, not out of covetousness for fame, he said, or a desire for power, but because of his deep distress over the present situation of the nation and its citizens. Rejecting the use

of violence, he considers dialogue the only road to peace. He is against political confessionalism and believes that the best Lebanese is the one who sacrifices most for the welfare of the nation.

The interview which follows will provide a fuller profile of Sfeir's thought on matters of vital concern to Lebanon and its people today:

Maverick or Erasmus?

[Question] Who is Henri Sfeir, and what political stand does he represent?

[Answer] It is difficult for someone to talk for himself; this should be left to others, to public opinion. If someone speaks about himself, he can never be objective.

Some people say that I am a maverick in the present political arena. I believe in Lebanon, in its perenniarity, sovereignty and unity. I believe in Lebanon as a country of Man, and devote my thoughts and actions to a possible better-being of my country.

Undoubtedly I am from the depth of Maronism, and geographically from Kesruan.

If you consider the political scene as it is described in the media, I may look politically as a Christian among Moslems and as a Moslem among Christians, paving the road for a real consensus through a dynamic process of synthesis towards national unity.

This position recalls difficult the political position of the great humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam during the Renaissance.

I look for the straight line that ties the citizen directly to his nation, and not through his sect or clan; thus we overpass confessionalism and feudalism which—until now—have prevented the citizen from reaching his real citizenship. These bonds prevented the Lebanese from realizing himself. This is on the national level.

On the regional and international level Lebanon has to take into consideration its geographic, political, cultural and civilizational links. I do not believe in such proposals which look for the illusionary neutrality of Lebanon, as if Lebanon could be separated from its environment. I do not agree with those who claim that Lebanon's strength lies in its weakness. Lebanon is fully part of the Arab Near East, part of its worries, and shares its issues and problems.

[Question] Do you categorize yourself among the names proposed for the presidential election, or to speak more directly, are you a candidate for the presidency?

[Answer] I believe any candidacy for the presidency should stem from a parliamentary group or bloc. Reports about my possible candidacy honor me and embarrass me. They honor me because those who make such proposal do believe that I have ability and means to save Lebanon and extract our country from its present mud. But they also embarrass me because it is a huge mission and requires a total common effort from all the Lebanese to resuscitate our country.

[Question] There are reports that the holding of the presidential election may be obstructed. Is this a possibility, and do you expect adverse security developments?

[Answer] This grave and astonishing possibility emerged from the declaration of President Amin Gemayel to the French RFI radio, in which he doubted the holding of the election. This is very grave and really astonishing, because the first and most important role of the President of the Republic is to be the guarantor of constitutional continuity and to keep running the constitutional wheels within the framework of his constitutional oath. He should secure all means for the continuity of legitimacy—and this task is more decisive now than before because the presidential election is linked with the fate of Lebanon: blocking presidential elections would lead to the final disintegration of Lebanon. Those who are using this means as a tactical move are gambling with the fate of Lebanon and the destiny of our people.

On my side and according to contacts and information I have had, I can confirm that, in spite of all those of ill-will, the elections will take place, and rely on the nationalism and integrity of the speaker of Parliament and all members of Parliament to let election occur during the constitutional period.

From an analytical point of view, I do not think that Israel will launch any military adventure, on a big scale, in South Lebanon or against Lebanon as a whole. Its previous experience and internal Israeli factors will not allow Israel a new adventure.

[Question] Might Israel not do something, not necessarily mount an invasion, but something else, to obstruct the presidential election?

[Answer] Let us consider what could be the aim behind obstructing presidential elections. Undoubtedly, anyone who intends to obstruct the election is working for partition and has to know that consequently Lebanon's partition will lead to the partition of all the region. If the international community accepts the partition of Lebanon into sectarian microstates, this will spread to all the area. Sectarian microstates should lead to an Alawite state, and to a Kurdish state, then we can foresee that Lebanon's partition could lead to even Turkey's partition. This is surely an unacceptable issue for the great powers.

And if it is what Israel seeks, I can say that when Israel dealt with the Lebanese issue, Israel was not able to fulfill its goals.

[Question] What do you mean by "when it dealt with Lebanon?"

[Answer] I mean that when I, as I waged war against the Arab, it achieved military and political victories, but when it invaded Lebanon, it probably achieved military victory, but failed to achieve political gains. But how did it quit Lebanon? It quit Lebanon when the May 17 (1983) Agreement was canceled, and the multi-national forces left the Lebanese shores, leaving Lebanon to the great Lebanese national resistance.

[Question] But on the other hand, Israel left Lebanon in a state of economic collapse, did it not?

[Answer] I think the disintegration of Lebanon and its economic collapse were the result of stupidity among some Lebanese decision-makers. Undoubtedly, the Israeli invasion greatly affected our economy, but the invasion did not sell the reserve dollars for foreign currency, as did the Central Bank in 1983-1984, nor did the invasion require the state to spend for weapons and unproductive items, in spite of the great deficit in the state budget. We are mistaken in our interaction with our economy.

When Israel left the country, the regime might have been able to reconcile the Lebanese with each other and to achieve national unity. When the Army entered West Beirut in 1983, and when in spite of the fierce attacks at that time, I heard Moslem leaders from West Beirut saying, "Had this taken place in East Beirut, we would have been united. Why did that not take place in East Beirut?"

However, it is easy to put the blame on others, especially on Israel, but we should be aware of our faults and shoulder our responsibilities in regard to these faults, otherwise we cannot be of any help in the required reforms and in the sincere behavior. Thus, I do not expect any Israeli invasion nor any Israeli military moves. Mr. Uri Lubrani, the Israeli official in Lebanon, made a statement declaring that Israel will give its viewpoint to its ally, the United States, which has a great influence in Lebanon.

[Question] Do you think the talks now taking place between the U.S. and Syria will lead to any positive result?

[Answer] I think that no definitive result could occur during this period preceding so many strategic deadlines: the U.S. presidential election, the Lebanese presidential election, the French presidential election, the Israeli general election in the fall, and especially the need to establish much more deeply-rooted *glasnost* in the Soviet Union. The present talks are needed to enrich the U.S.

Near Eastern file for the forthcoming June summit in Moscow. If, while that process of enrichment continues, slight improvements could be achieved, then minor results could occur, but Lebanon does not need minor results, Lebanon does not need partial restoration. Lebanon needs a complete dynamic process of resuscitation and restructuring to reach its new republic.

[Question] What kind of prospect will face the new president? Will he be a president who will bring forth a solution, or will he be just a president to manage the crisis?

[Answer] As I said before, Lebanon's new republic will emerge only through a total restructuring of the country, under a new kind of leadership. Leadership in the Near East has a much more important role than it has in the Western countries. In our area men are often more important than institutions, but in modern Western democracies institutions are much more important than leaders: in France the king was called "Louis of France"; in England the king was called "George of England"; but here it's Nasser's Egypt" or "Assad's Syria". And this is not only sycophancy, but facts and realities that our peoples recognize.

When in France the right-wing President Giscard d'E斯塔ing was replaced by the Socialist Mitterrand. France changed only at a rate of about 15 percent, but when Abdel-Nasser died, Sadat's Egypt changed 100 percent, and when Sadat was assassinated, Mubarak's Egypt changed anew.

You can hardly recognize the Syria of Hafez al-Assad if you compare it to the Syria of Shishakli or Kuwaiti. And in Lebanon under President Sarkis' regime, since Sarkis was credible financially but weak politically, Lebanon resisted financially but collapsed politically.

That's why I think the coming Lebanese phase will depend very much on the abilities and qualifications of the forthcoming president.

To answer the second part of your question, I do not think that any candidate for the presidency can be looking forward to "managing" the Lebanese crisis. I personally think it is neither dignifying nor interesting. But one has to know also that Lebanon's salvation does not depend only on the good will of the future president; it depends on the will of the Lebanese to hang together. And as the American proverb says, either they hang together, or each one will hang separately.

Lebanon's salvation depends also on the attainment of international and regional consensus. And one should be very careful about hopes in this respect: if General de Gaulle used to say that a great country has not many friends, I would say that a small country has even fewer.

So we have to be realistic: Lebanon can hardly interfere in the parameters of the international equation.

An intelligent Lebanese leader should be smart enough to discover the international factors to be able to pilot the Lebanese vessel. In fact, the birth of the state of Lebanon as it is now occurred in 1920 as a result of a three-level consensus: international, regional, and internal.

International consensus was reached by the 1919 Conference of Versailles.

On the regional level consensus was shaped by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1917.

The internal consensus was reached by the Maronite Patriarch, Elias al-Huwayek, rallying around him Lebanese leaders from all communities.

Lebanon's new republic should emerge also as a result of a three-level consensus:

International consensus could be hoped, thanks to the *glasnost* of General Secretary Gorbachev and to the pragmatism of President Reagan, and the warm atmosphere spread by the December summit.

Regional consensus will be achieved through a well-equilibrated international conference of peace, and the present West Bank events should logically lead to this issue.

On the internal level, I beg the Lebanese people and leaders to become reasonable and reach an internal consensus to be able to meet the two other levels of consensus. Otherwise, the world will become fed up with us, and we will find we have very few friends indeed.

[Question] The approaching Lebanese presidential election and the resumption of the Syrian-American dialogue have reopened the door to discussion of the Lebanese crisis, and this discussion has centered on the elimination of political confessionalism and on power-sharing. How do you view these two issues, and do you think their fulfillment is sufficient to create a new Lebanon?

[Answer] Let me first declare that Lebanon's new republic cannot be achieved through a partial project or two partial projects. The new Lebanon is a dynamic attitude towards the identity of the country, towards the citizenship, the development and the total restructuring of the country.

But to answer your question directly, I have already stated at the beginning of this interview that I do not foresee power-sharing as a well-balanced formula to federate communities: Lebanon should never again be a confederation of confessions. Otherwise, why should we cancel the 1943 National Pact? It was a good pact, since it served Lebanon for 32 years.

Our goal should be to tie the citizen directly to the nation. But the elimination of sectarianism cannot take place overnight, or through a magic formula lying on a pretty piece of paper. It should be the outcome of a clear, well-defined program that requires from 12 to 18 years to be achieved through a wise policy in the fields of education and information: then a new generation will overpass confessionalism, will interact with the nation as citizens, and each one will worship his God in the church or the mosque he likes.

Instead of understanding by power-sharing a charter for confessions or sects, real power-sharing is the charter of the citizen's rights. The real power-sharing is when we reach a system democratic enough to secure to the citizen his participation in the development of the society he wants in the future, and his participation in the management of power.

[Question] What kind of new leadership is capable of fulfilling the goals of the new Lebanon?

[Answer] This new leadership is the one that is able to secure the means for creating the new generation of citizens and to help to generate the dynamic spark for the unifying movement of Lebanon towards common goals. This new leadership should be aware of the political facts of Lebanon, and know how to coordinate potentialities and activate capabilities to help Lebanon enter the 21st century in the best shape. It should restore to the citizen what is his property, what are his rights, and should prepare a new Lebanese citizenship.

[Question] What do you mean by "the new leadership should prepare a new Lebanese citizenship"?

[Answer] All those who assumed power as presidents of the Lebanese Republic were attracted by Western technological superiority and tried to imitate it, ignoring what was said by Rudyard Kipling: "East is East and West is West." They did not look into the specificities of Lebanon. The new leadership has to take these specificities into consideration to rule Lebanon and consequently to enrich the Lebanese personality.

The new Lebanese citizen should be Lebanese, with all Lebanese characteristics.

[Question] How can one make this transformation? How can the Lebanese focus on his nation and not his sect?

[Answer] This is easy and difficult at the same time. It is easy if you follow the right channel or the methods with appropriate means. As for instance, the most important means is the educational system. How can we have one kind of citizen, since we have 107 history books about Lebanon taught in schools and academies? This means that there are 107 different understandings of the history of Lebanon.

[Question] In a previous interview you said that you disagree on negotiation from a position of weakness. Lebanon is now weak with regard to Syria, so how can negotiations take place from a strong position, or on an equal basis?

[Answer] First, Lebanon is not in confrontation with Syria. On the contrary, Lebanon is allied to Syria. When I said "negotiations", I meant negotiations with Israel, especially since certain projects in the Middle East call for bilateral negotiations, which means a continuation of the Camp David process.

I feel that Lebanon's interest lies in Arab solidarity to reach a strategic equilibrium which alone can enable us to achieve a just and long-lasting peace.

Today I am afraid that the one who wants to negotiate with us will do so in a suspicious and cautious manner, because during the negotiations of May 17, Israel sent a message to the Lebanese President putting into it additional conditions, such as requiring Syria's approval, and thus it was clear that the enemy himself was rejecting our negotiation because we were very weak and could not fulfill our commitments. We should recover our strength and know how to benefit from it through Arab solidarity, in a bid to form an adequate part of the strategic equilibrium. In this event, we can achieve an equilibrium of pride. I do not believe in a just peace without the equilibrium of pride, and with it and with the strategic equilibrium we can hold negotiations with Israel on the table of the international conference for peace.

[Question] On what basis and on what topics will the negotiations with Israel take place?

[Answer] Lebanon will be discussed within the Arab-Israeli negotiations, and I do not think anyone desire to cancel Israel. The Israeli presence has been achieved at a very heavy price, namely the Palestinian tragedy over the Arab prestige and heritage. When unanimous approval was reached during the Fez summit to hold dialogue and negotiations, we were represented during this summit, and decided with the conferees to hold negotiations. On emerging from the summit, some of the Arabs understood negotiations as speedy bilateral negotiations similar to the Camp David process, while others should firm in spite of the difficulties that were confronting them, and thus they claimed strategic equilibrium before negotiations. Evidently, when President Hafez al-Assad spoke of strategic equilibrium, he was right, because he sought to achieve the interest of Syria as the first step, and the interest of the Arabs as a whole, including Lebanon. Those who did not understand this interpretation followed the path of May 17, the path of bilateral negotiations, and consequently were doomed to failure.

The strategic equilibrium between the Arabs and Israel may take a long time before it is achieved, but one should follow this course to begin with. In the event that

the conjuncture leads us to negotiate before reaching strategic equilibrium, we can have the guarantee of one of the superpowers on the table of negotiations which could be used to fill in the gaps of the lack of strategic equilibrium. It should be made clear that the guarantee of the super powers can fill a gap for a short period and not always. If we go ahead in the course, the circumstances could become more adequate for peace negotiations. The first step should be on the way of strategic equilibrium which will consequently lead to peace.

[Question] Some of the political sides object to the alliance and think that complementarity with Syria will harm Lebanon's sovereignty.

[Answer] Absolute sovereignty does not exist in political realities. I do not know of any country in the world that is absolutely sovereign.

Absolute sovereignty means total isolation, and this cannot take place unless you live in a neglected, forgotten island enjoying economic autarky, and this we know is imagination.

Sovereignty is a philosophical, internal stand. Many dignified prisoners could feel sovereign when powerful dictators are in fact in jail by their injustice.

Interaction is the basis of our world, especially now with the development of media. Any earthquake in Japan will immediately affect the money and raw material markets in Europe.

Moreover, complementarity is not integration; on the contrary, asking for complementary supposes differentiation. And to those who claim that complementarity will harm Lebanese sovereignty, I would like to announce to them that the holy Pope John Paul II, in his latest encyclical letter, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, the 35th article, advocates complementarity between neighboring countries, respecting at the same time each one's liberty.

[Question] In what context do you envisage Arab-Israeli negotiations?

[Answer] I have constantly reiterated my objection to the Camp David [passage indistinct] peace. If peace, as defined by Saint Thomas Aquinas, implies the stability of a regime, then the outcome of the Camp David accords has no link with peace. Those accords have, instead, instigated chaos and a fierce resistance, the foremost of which is the Lebanese National Resistance, and the "upheaval of stones" currently taking place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The only negotiations that could lead to a permanent and just peace in the region are those conducted in the framework of the international peace conference, whereby all participants would respect the basic points and the form in which the conference takes place.

[Question] You touched on the form of the conference. Why?

[Answer] Because the history of international conferences has taught us that the form is the main aspect that ensures the success of such a conference. To cite an example, the first peace conference in the world was the Congress of Westphalia, which lasted for five years, from the beginning of 1644 to 1648. The formal preparations for this conference took almost a year, of which three months were designated to determine the negotiation table. The table was at first rectangular, then triangular, and later square, until agreement on it being circular was finally reached. After that the Queen of Sweden was angered because the invitation sent to her only mentioned twelve of her titles, ignoring the thirteenth. At the end of this conference led to peace in Europe following the Thirty Years' War, and it also led to an agreement on the balance of power between those states, and not to a strategic equilibrium.

After this conference diplomatic missions started between states, with a basic aim of monitoring the balance of power.

The second peace conference in the world only lasted for two years, and was known as the Utrecht Congress, which was held from 1712-1713. The third peace conference was that of Vienna, which lasted only for six months in 1815. Then came the Versailles Conference which settled the disputes of the great powers in a period of six months. The fifth conference was that of San Francisco, which lasted for two months.

This is in regard to form. As to the basis, those conferences only sought to achieve a power balance between states. Even today, the Reagan-Gorbachev Washington summit of last December only sought to achieve a power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On his part, President Assad emphasizes the strategic equilibrium, as I have said.

[Question] What is the difference between a power balance and a strategic equilibrium?

[Answer] Achieving a power balance implies a static position that ensures equilibrium between the various powers, but which eventually leads to a sort of suspicion and a coexistence of terror, while achieving a strategic equilibrium leads to a dynamic position, whereby the military power balance constitutes but an aspect and not the whole, since a strategic equilibrium requires the development of human and natural resources, as it also requires two major positions concerning the international peace conference:

I-The adoption of a policy between Arab states that will ensure solidarity on a unified plan for negotiations.

2-If a global strategic equilibrium is not soon ensured, then the effective participation of the Soviet Union in this conference is expected to fill the gap, temporarily, on behalf of the Arabs, to achieve a strategic equilibrium at the negotiation table.

In general, President Assad today is following in the footsteps of the Romans, whom Montesquieu once described, while analyzing the greatness of Rome, as never accepting to negotiate from a point of weakness, whatever the extent of the crisis facing them.

I envisage the current position of Syria as rational, and seeking a true peace. For what peace will the Israelis sign with divided negotiators, who are not capable of taking a common position while negotiating or even refusing?

[Question] Amidst this strategic orientation, where is Lebanon's position and role?

[Answer] Lebanon and those concerned for it are basically responsible to ensure the continuity of its entity, independence and sovereignty. None of these recognize the Israeli presence on Lebanon's southern borders, or elsewhere in Lebanon. Only Arab solidarity can ensure Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. This solidarity has an activating axis, the Syro-Lebanese axis.

As for the understanding of Lebanon's position as perceived by the drafters of the May 17 agreement, it is definitely wrong. Following the Fez summit the Lebanese regime turned to the Arabs, who rallied to Lebanon for bilateral negotiations, ignoring its position as an occupied country and the international law on agreements adopted in 1969 which states that any political agreement reached between two or more states, at a time when the army of one of those states is occupying the other state or states, is considered null and void. Consequently, the May 17 Agreement is void not only to Lebanese, but to the Israelis in particular, because the latter are well aware of the international treaties. That is why they added to the agreement a condition implying Syria's approval of some of its terms, since they knew the impotence of the Lebanese regime and its inability to implement this agreement.

What concerns Lebanon on the strategic-dynamic orientation, which President Assad spoke about, is the ultimate and effective support the Lebanese National Resistance is getting, since it is the core of a strategic equilibrium. This support currently offered to the National Resistance in Lebanon is not less than the support now offered to the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza.

We should rationally and pragmatically realize that Lebanon is a major side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, amidst the international conditions Lebanon has not been and is not now able to fulfill its role in the Arab-Israeli struggle in the absence of Arab solidarity.

[Question] How in your opinion is strategic equilibrium achieved?

[Answer] As I have said, strategic equilibrium is a global one that the Arab states could realize through Arab solidarity, and which will include all sectors in every state. The strategic equilibrium starts with strengthening the military power balance with human and material resources.

1-In respect to human resources, this equilibrium requires the development in quality of the Arab military factor;

2-Developing military structures;

3-Emphasis on establishing our own war industries;

4-Determining military goals clearly and precisely, since a clear national stand unifies our armies.

On the other hand we should develop our economy so every Arab state becomes productive, so as to eventually achieve the complementary economy required for reaching a strategic equilibrium. A flourishing economy is in itself a unifying factor to all states. Moreover, a complementary economy among the Arab states requires Arab solidarity in other fields.

We should also work on establishing complete and rational diplomatic cooperation between the Arab states that would allow each state to play its role and maintain its relations of friendship, and its international relations. Such cooperation could provide Arab diplomacy with strong credibility on the international scene.

Finally, the strategic equilibrium, being a dynamic orientation, will not be achieved, or will not continue, without realization of a new global outlook on our new generation and our national media.

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Presidential Candidate Sham'un Presents His Platform

44000056b Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English
21-27 Mar 88 pp 6-7

[Text] A secular and neutral nation having friendly relations with Syria and abiding by the 1949 armistice with Israel, and a nation where the revived democratic rules of the 1926 Constitution, "slightly amended" should govern a people unified under the 1943 National pact in a land where no one is above the law—such is, in a nutshell, the Lebanon called for by presidential hopeful Dany Chamoun, 54, the leader of the National Liberal Party, who on March 5 announced his candidature in the upcoming presidential elections to be held in the summer.

The announcement was made at a Beirut press conference, where Chamoun presented his platform, or statement of aims and aspirations he would aim to fulfill during his presidency, if elected.

The platform calls for friendly relations with Syria based on the principle of mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty of both countries, a respect underpinned by diplomatic representation in each other's capital something which does not exist at the moment. As the security of Lebanon is closely linked to that of Syria, the platform says, the two states should each guarantee the border security of the other.

The seventh provision of the platform lays stress on the independence of Lebanon and the need for the country's neutrality in regard to inter-Arab conflicts. It was such conflicts, the platform says, that were largely responsible for the outbreak of Lebanon's current troubles in 1975.

The platform also calls for the withdrawal from Lebanon of all "foreign or illegal" military forces. While supporting the rights of the Palestinian people in their struggle for self-determination, the platform rejects their armed presence in Lebanon. And in regard to Lebanon's relations with Israel, the platform emphasizes the importance of reviving the 1949 armistice agreement between the two countries, as well as a greater role for the United Nations forces in Lebanon "to safeguard the safety and security of the land and people of the South" until an international conference finds a peaceful resolution of the Middle East crisis that would lead to a normalization of relations between Lebanon and Israel.

Citing the Austrian experience as an example, the platform stresses Lebanon's non-alignment in international relations. "Lebanon should preserve the best relations of friendship and mutual respect with all nations without exception", it says. On the Arab level it calls for "privileged relations with all countries of the Arab world."

To bring the civil conflict in Lebanon to an end, the platform gives weight to the need for dialogue among all the concerned parties to reach "decisive measures for bringing back normal life to Lebanon."

The platform notes shortcomings in applying the stipulations of the Constitution, which it describes as secular, in regard to problems pertaining to relations among sects as well as to other problems of a political, administrative and judicial nature. The platform lauds the Constitution for not providing for the establishment of a state religion but rather provides for the protection of all religious beliefs and the safeguarding of human rights. "Thus, we see no reason for making drastic changes in the Constitution", the platform says, "but rather call for the application of those rulings which have not been applied previously due to negligence... such as the setting up of a supreme court to try senior officials, including the president of the republic."

Electoral Law: The platform calls for equal employment opportunities for all, regardless of sectarian affiliation, as a means of combating confessionalism and of promoting a democratic way of life. It also calls for the drafting of a new electoral law which would take into consideration demographic changes that have occurred in recent years, and notes that the National Liberal Party once submitted a proposal to this effect to Parliament.

The platform notes that the methods of government should change in line with significant changes on the social, demographic and economic levels. It envisages a solution to the problem of what to do about the National pact (which apportions the offices of president, house speaker and prime minister to the Maronite, Shiite and Sunnite sects, respectively), a solution which, it says, would revive a democratic spirit in the country and give people new faith in their institutions.

Army: The platform calls for a reorganization of the Lebanese Army and the specification of its duties. It says the Army should be smaller in size but better-trained, and shielded from political currents. There should, it says, be a national defense council having as permanent members the president, house speaker, prime minister, defense minister and interior minister. The president should hold the titular post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Economy: The consolidation of Lebanon's liberal economic system is an important "plank" in the platform, as is the strengthening of its industrial, agricultural, banking and touristic sectors. Foreign investment is to be encouraged, and the whole system should be assisted by a decentralization of administrative procedures.

The platform states that it respects the right of religious fundamentalists to their beliefs. "Every individual has the right to believe as he chooses, as long as he keeps his beliefs to himself.

But such beliefs should never be contrary to the interests of Lebanon and its people."

There is also a call for urgent action against terrorism and drug-trafficking with the aid of international organizations.

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MOROCCO

Limited Employment Opportunity Despite Rising Industrial Investments

45190027a Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French
7 Jan 88 p 2

[Text] According to the economic bulletin, CEDIES [Socio-Economic Research and Information Center] INFORMATIONS, investments approved in the framework of the 1983 Investment Incentive Code are said to have steadily increased up to the end of November 1987.

It should be noted, however, that the increase has been insignificant with regards to jobs created between 1986 and 1987, since less than 900 were recorded in one year, or less than three per day. For our readers' information, we publish below the text pertaining to approved industrial investments, as formulated by the MAP [MAGHREB-ARAB PRESS AGENCY].

The economic bulletin, CEDIES INFORMATIONS, indicated that investments approved in the framework of the 1983 Investment Incentive Code are increasing steadily. As of late November 1987, approved investments, amounting to 36,745 million dirhams, registered a 25 percent increase for a 41.25 percent increase in future jobs and a 19 percent increase in the number of dossiers. The largest increases were in industrial-type enterprises, service companies serving industry and the textile and leather sector. On the other hand, in food crops, chemistry and parachemistry and electrical engineering, the amount of projected investments is declining even though the number of approved dossiers is rising for those three sectors.

With 1,509,404 DH [dirham] and 494 dossiers, the textile and leather sector accounts for more than 41 percent of the overall approved amount; it thus remains that more jobs will be generated by that sector, with a projection of 26,554 jobs as compared to 15,223 for the same 1986 period.

The chemistry-parachemistry sector, with 18 percent (25 percent in 1986) comes in second, despite the small increase in future jobs (-8 percent).

The food crop sector accounts for 14.6 percent, as compared to 26.3 percent in 1986; industrial-type enterprises, for 15.5 percent, as compared to 8.12 percent in 1986; IMME (Mechanical, Metallurgic and Electrical Engineering), for 9.95 percent, as compared to 13.23 percent in a previous year; and, finally, the service enterprises serving industry continue to account for less than 1 percent (0.74 percent in 1987 and 0.44 percent in 1986).

Hundred and two dossiers were approved in November, or 4 more projects than were approved last year for the same month and 8 less, as compared to October. Total investments for these dossiers amount to 466 MDH [million dirhams], or more than 92 percent as compared to November 1986. These investments will necessitate expenses of 295 MDH in foreign exchange, or 106 percent as compared to the same month of last year, and projected jobs number 3,876, or 896 more than in November 1986.

Eighty-two percent of the investors are private Moroccans, 15 percent, foreigners and 3 percent, the public sector. Thirty-eight percent of the overall foreign investments and 5 percent of the invested amount are provided by France; 26 percent and 4 percent respectively,

by the FRG; 13 percent and 2 percent, by Saudi Arabia; 6 percent and 1 percent, by the USA; 3 percent and 0.2 percent, by Iraq; and, finally, 2 percent and 0.3 percent, by Syria.

The average investment per dossier amounts to 4.5 MDH and it takes approximately 120,000 DH to create a job when it comes to the dossiers approved in November 1987.

6857

Comparison of Water Reserve Statistics for 1986, 1987

45190027b Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French
13-14 Dec 87 p 2

[Excerpt] Since the beginning of the 1987 crop year, the entire country has benefited from extensive and generalized rainfall, which sometimes produced rainstorms like those that occurred during the first week of November and December and resulted in heavy floods, particularly in the Oued Aououz and the Essaouiat El Hamra. Recorded as having a volume of 100 million cubic meters, the Es-Squiait El Hamra flood was the heaviest one since 1957.

The rain, beneficial from the standpoints of agriculture and replenishing of the underground water table, also supplied much water to the dams.

Thus, from 1 September to 9 December 1987, the volume of water supplied to the entire dam system was 1,600 million cubic meters. This exceeds last year's figure for the same period by 170 percent. Particularly important was the volume of water supplied to the Mansour Eddahbi (395 mm [as published]), Moulay Youssef (110 mm³), Mohammed V (145 mm³), Abdemoumen (80 mm³) and Lalla Takarkoust (160 mm³) dams. The latter dam began discharging on 4 November 1987. Since then, the volume discharged has been approximately 70 million cubic meters.

The total reserve of water available at the dams as of 9 December 1987 is 4,286 million cubic meters, or an overall filling rate of 45.4 percent, as compared to last year's figure of 3,612 mm³, or 39.3 percent, for the same date. The current filling rates vary from one dam to the next; they are substantial at the Lalla Takarkoust (100 percent) and Mansour Eddahbi (72 percent) dams which have not recorded such a rate since 1980.

The current filling rate per dam is higher or equal to that of last year's for the same date.

Moreover, from the beginning of September 1987 to this day, the dams were able to provide water for agriculture, drinking and energy, the volume amounting to approximately 1 billion cubic meters.

As for the underground tables, a noted improvement of their water level has been recorded for practically all of them.

As compared to the levels recorded in the beginning of September 1987, the current levels are higher, particularly in the coastal Mediterranean tables, those of the middle Dra and of the Souss where local levels rose between 1 and 3 meters.

The following table shows the status of the water reserves for each dam between 9 December 1986 and 9 December 1987.

6857

SAUDI ARABIA

Magazine Analyzes Tendency To Invest Abroad
44040127 Riyadh AL-DA'WAH in Arabic
14 Feb 88 pp 14-18

[Article: "Emigrating Arab Capital: Management Problems or Mistrust?"]

[Text] Patriots have long wondered how much longer will our Islamic and Arab efforts remain fragmented and how long will our Islamic and Arab capital continue to immigrate to non-Muslim countries to be "stored" or invested while the Islamic world "slumbers", to use their words?

Young people, zealous and enthusiastic but frequently gripped by despair, wonder how much longer will the tons of raw material extracted from Arab and Islamic soil remain exported to East and West? How much longer will Muslim Arab brains continue to immigrate to Europe and America? How much longer will human resources remain idle, justly or unjustly? Aren't those the elements needed in any country to create an industrial, agricultural, commercial, and investment renaissance?

Those youths, faithful to their religion, their country, and their present and future, have a right to wonder and even sometimes worry or get angry. Statistics indicate that capital, raw materials, expertise, and skilled labor are employed to their maximum potential in the West but underutilized minimally in Arab and Islamic countries. This means that Arab and Muslim capital, effort, and resources are invested in the interest of others with little benefit at home.

Arab surplus invested abroad was estimated a few years ago at some \$600 billion compared to only \$12 billion invested in the Arab world.

It is a known fact that countries of the Muslim world have a pressing need to invest every penny in agriculture, industry, trade, or any other productive sector.

Vast acreage of good land needs to be reclaimed and cultivated. Flowing rivers still carry their daily gift of water to the sea. Industry in the Muslim world remains generally undeveloped. The balance of accounts payable jumps by leaps and bounds to snuff any glimmer of hope. The balance of accounts receivable still bemoans its fate in most Muslim lands.

Egypt needs expatriate Arab capital and offers vast investment opportunities, and so does the Sudan. Pakistan, Bangladesh, black Africa, North Africa, and some Muslim countries of Asia are all in need of cultivation, industrialization, and development. But the question persists—why is discretionary Arab capital attracted to the West and why does it shun Muslim countries? Is it because of bad management or because of the lack of trust?

That is the question we tried to answer in this investigative report which, by necessity, had to also delve into secondary issues related to the subject at hand. AL-DA'WAH sought to bring the view of experts to the attention of the reader in the hope that one day we will see the virtue of investing Arab capital in the Arab homeland, or maybe we should say Islamic capital in the Muslim world.

Are There Investment Opportunities for Arab Capital?

AL-DA'WAH posed a direct question on whether there are Arab and Muslim investment opportunities available to expatriate capital and on how to convince Arab venture capitalists to invest their funds in Arab and Muslim countries. It goes without saying that capital is worthless without investment that allows it to circulate and grow and that its recall from the West under those conditions would be a meaningless reaction.

Dr. Muhammad Shawqi al-Fanjari, professor of Islamic economy and former Egyptian under-secretary of state, answered:

There are priorities to investing Islamic capital. Shari'ah mandates that it be employed for the production of necessities such as bread, foodstuffs, clothes, medicine, and suitable housing. This should take precedence over secondary or luxury products such as mansions and palaces or perfume factories.

Opportunities to employ Islamic capital are plentiful and vary according to the needs of man in the sectors of agriculture, industry, real estate, trade, services...etc.

Is There a Real Need for Investment?

Dr. Shawqi al-Fanjari continues: What matters is that capital be invested after careful study and planning. It therefore behoves each Islamic country to issue a directory of its real needs in sectors that are open to investors. Such a directory should also contain a feasibility study of each project. This would allow investment of capital to

meet the needs of that Muslim country; it would encourage investment in an open climate devoid of obstacles; and foster a certain degree of anticipated success and return on investment.

We look to the Arab League to come up with such an investment guide for the Arab world and to the secretariat of the Islamic Conference to issue an investment guide to the Muslim world. Without such guides, a discussion of investment in Arab and Muslim countries would be worthless.

Opportunities Are Too Numerous to Mention

Mr. 'Abdallah al-Khuthlan, Director General of Administrative and Economic Consulting with the Saudi House of Investment Services, says:

Investment opportunities in Islamic countries are too numerous to mention since our Islamic world still lacks many of the goods and services needed to improve quality of life and lessen dependence on goods and services imported from non-Muslim lands. For instance, opportunities are plentiful in service industries such as hotels, hospitals, factories, and maintenance and training facilities. Muslim countries also offer numerous investment opportunities in various agricultural and industrial projects.

There Should Be a Proper Investment Climate

How do you convince the Arab financier to invest his funds in the Islamic world rather than abroad? Mr. al-Khuthlan answers:

The way to induce financiers to invest domestically is to provide them with the proper investment climate. No reasonable person, no matter how patriotic, would invest all his capital under poor conditions where his funds are subjected to arbitrary and capricious measures.

Delayed payments to investors would have a definite negative impact and so would the threats of military coups, changes in government, confiscation of capital, the lack of protection from unfair competition, and imposed labor organizations, unreasonable taxes, or price controls. Many of these occur in countries whose many interests do not include the welfare of native capital which is then obliged to seek better investment climates in other lands. A country that seeks to protect its citizens' capital should extend to them the same inducements offered foreigners in order to keep them invested locally.

Liquidity, Profitability, and Security

Dr. Shawqi al-Fanjari, emphasizing that the existence of guarantees would encourage the investment of Arab capital in the Muslim world, explains:

It is a known fact that venture capital is conservative by nature. A financier spends a great deal of effort to make his fortune and he has a right to invest with great care and caution.

We must be practical and understand that Arab and Islamic venture capital, which is plentiful thanks to God, can be attracted only if three conditions are present: liquidity, profitability, and security.

In order to induce the investment of Arab and Muslim capital domestically or in the Arab or the Islamic worlds, we must protect the investor's right to the highest return at the least risk with the utmost security. This equation is no longer difficult and has become quite tenable through Islamic banks and financing institutions which, though young in years, have become leaders in attracting deposits, then investing them to the best advantage. Some of these institutions have consistently paid an annual return of 20 percent over the past four years. Such a very high return has attracted a lot of deposits valued at more than \$1 trillion.

No to "Superfluous" Investment

We pause here to ask that these institutions engage in active investment in agriculture, industry, commerce...etc. rather than superfluous investment such as trading in foreign currency or gold.

Arab and Islamic economies should benefit proportionately from such huge Arab and Islamic deposits which are not invested abroad.

When the discussion turned to requirements for productive economic units, their availability in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and ways to overcome economic investment problems, Dr. Shawqi al-Fanjari continued:

The elements of production are four—natural resources, capital, labor; and management.

We in the Islamic world generally and in the Arab world particularly have, thanks to God, unlimited natural resources, a huge labor force, and plenty of capital. The problem is that these resources lack study and quantification. Human resources lack education and training. Venture capital needs security to be invested in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

That is the crux of the economic problem in the Arab and Islamic worlds. There is great disparity between the tremendous potential and the bitter reality. Like a coin, every element of production has two faces. Human resources are useless without training. Venture capital is useless without investment and security.

We estimate that our economic problem, whether in the Arab, Islamic, or developing worlds, is mostly caused by mismanagement, bad organization, or flawed planning. What about all the neglected human resources and the wasted capital!!

Administrative and Organizational Competence Lacking

Mr. al-Khuthlan agrees with Dr. al-Fanjari that administrative and organizational weakness, as well as the lack of security drive away capital or are unable to attract it.

Mr. al-Khuthlan notes that economists have long defined the elements of economic productivity and summarized them as capital, labor, and raw material. Other imperative elements became apparent as technology developed. They are numerous, varied, and differ according to the projects involved. Most important among them are administrative competence, the availability of technology, and competitive marketing.

Capital Is Cautious Rather Than Cowardly

As the dialogue develops, the question is posed: What is the way out? How do we initiate investment in our Arab and Islamic lands?

Mr. al-Khuthlan disagrees with the common wisdom that capital is cowardly. Rather, it is cautious, prudent, and seeks the best investment mix of high return and low risk. There is no denying that financiers in Muslim countries invest part of their capital abroad but many also invest in Islamic lands, sometimes motivated more by emotion than by economics. It is everyone's national duty to protect Islamic capital, especially by not forcing it into bad investments no matter where. Successfully investing Islamic capital and providing it with the best avenues to grow would insure for us adequate future fiscal resources. If proper investment opportunities were not available in Islamic countries, it would be more prudent to avoid risk and to temporarily invest in foreign countries in order to reduce risk and preserve capital until the proper time.

Cooperation Between the Individual and the State

Dr. Shawqi al-Fanjari believes that Islam's mandate of cooperation between the individual and the state is a fundamental aspect of the economic issue. He does not agree with socialists who view the state as the key to problem-solving. Nor does he agree with capitalists thought that individual and self-help are the key. He would follow Islam's dictates that there should be cooperation between the individual and the state. Each plays a complementary role and neither can do without the other. Realistically the state cannot take care of everything. Overwhelming interference or total hands-off would lead to a multitude of ills. The crux of the Islamic economy is to seek the right formula for cooperation and complementarity between the individual and the state. It is the state's job to handle tasks untenable for the

individual, such as heavy industry, land reclamation, public utilities, or infrastructure facilities such as schools, hospitals, public transportation, etc.

The State Initiates, Individuals Builds

Dr. al-Fanjari applauds the Islamic course followed by Saudi Arabia in this regard. He says that "the state initiates and the individual builds" is one of the finest Islamic formulas available. It has enabled Saudi Arabia to accomplish a stunning economic and cultural renaissance. He also lauds a unique economic course applied by Saudi Arabia as an Islamic mandate and currently adopted by Japan as an economic initiative which calls on the state to reclaim barren land, build factories, maintain silos, and implement other projects needed by society. Once these become profitable, the state turns them over into corporations whose shares are made available to citizens in order to increase the number of owners, bolster national development, and develop economic awareness.

Investing Via Stock Exchanges

Dr. al-Fanjari responded to a question on the legitimacy of investing via the various exchanges whether in currency, stocks and bonds, or commodities. He said that an exchange is essentially a market organized to facilitate buying and selling in two fashions:—immediate, where the transaction is consummated instantly as the seller receives the price agreed and the buyer gets what he bought. This is a legitimate sales transaction accepted by Islamic law.

—futures where a contract is drawn with the understanding it would be consummated on a future date. The consensus Islamic scholars is that this is fine and legitimate provided both parties actually take possession of what they contracted for. In reality, however, futures are a means to benefit from price fluctuations over the term of the contract. Speculators settle various futures deals by paying the price differential without actually delivering the items under contract. This, then, is simply a gamble based on luck and coincidence and therefore outlawed in Islam. Those who practice this are sinners and their profits are ill-gained.

12945/9738

SUDAN

Libyan Military Delegation Reportedly in Darfur 45000056A Khartoum AL-USBU' in Arabic 4 Mar 88 p 1

[Text] Informed sources in Darfur Province have affirmed to AL-USBU' that another Libyan expedition arrived in the province in the last 2 weeks composed of 30 vehicles carrying supplies and accompanied by about 500 personnel.

Among them were 150 soldiers under the command of a Libyan officer named [only Arabic initials 'aleph', 'ayn' given]. He is the same officer who arrived in the province in 1986 at the head of Libyan troops in Darfur Province in the Klis area. He mentioned at that time that his forces were carrying relief supplies.

Our sources indicated that this operation was carried out without the knowledge of the local authorities and that among the vehicles were fast-moving "trans-desert" vehicles, with new communications sets and large quantities of gasoline.

Malwal Sees Transitional Charter as 'Hollow,' 'Meaningless'

45000039a Khartoum SUDAN TIMES in English
29 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by Bona Malwal]

[Text] After having carefully considered the Sudan Transitional Charter and its implications for the past 2 months, I now feel duty bound to comment upon it. My reluctance to do so at an earlier date was based upon several reasons. First, I wanted to give the document the chance to be judged by those most concerned with it. Secondly, I wanted to observe how the grand political practitioner, Prime Minister Sadiq El Mahdi, was going to play his cards with regards to the Charter. Thirdly, I thought it would be interesting to confound the critics who seem to believe that I am prejudiced against the Prime Minister to such an extent that they consider me not only unreasonable but also unreasoned. It seemed to me rather appropriate to let the Charter and its implications be digested by the politicians and others in the country, to let matters unfold by themselves, before making a comment upon its significance and use-value. Now that quite a lot has come to pass since the charter was first unveiled and signed, it is perhaps pertinent to examine some of the factors that motivated the Prime Minister into drafting the document.

By way of background on the contents of the Charter, it is necessary to stress that there is nothing particularly original in its wording or message. Everything that it states has been written in various forms in the other national documents, declarations and charters, supposedly in force today. Namely, the 1985 Transitional Constitution, the September 1983 Islamic laws, the April 1985 Popular Uprising Charter, the 1922 Self-Government Act for the South, the 1986 Koka Dam Declaration and most recently, the three East African declarations of 1987 signed between the Sudan African Parties and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). All these say, in one form or another, exactly what the Prime Minister has stated in the Sudan Transitional Charter, hence, in that narrow sense, the Charter is redundant as an innovative document.

The Prime Minister's motives for issuing the Charter, and objectives he intends eventually to attain through it, are quite clear and have become clearer with each additional clarification and explanation of the Charter's contents over the past 2 months. First, the Prime Minister hoped to use the Charter to repudiate and render redundant all the previous documents that he no longer has a use for. The particular ones that he had in mind were the 1986 Koka Dam Declaration and the 1987 East African Declarations, both of which have visibly irritated the Prime Minister for some time.

Sayed Sadiq has continually tried to brush Koka Dam aside, but all his attempts so far have rebounded back on him. As the Declaration was signed prior to the 1986 elections, he would like to think that the document is not a true reflection of the electorate's desires. A second reason is because the Declaration was not signed by some of his coalition partners in government, namely, the Democratic Unionist Party, and he has shown no inclination to impose its acceptance upon them. Thirdly, he believes that 2 years on, the document has outlived its purpose, especially since the Constitutional Conference has failed miserably to materialise. Sayed Sadiq has even advanced arguments alleging that the SPLA has violated Koka Dam by persisting with the military conflict in the South.

As for the three East African Declarations, these demonstrably annoyed the Prime Minister from the moment they were made public last year. The Sudan African Parties delegation that travelled to Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Kampala to attend talks with the SPLA, initially did so with the blessing of Sayed Sadiq. But that was before he realised that they were taking their mission seriously and had united around a common desire for a peaceful solution to the conflict. He had expected them to at least bicker amongst each other and condemn the SPLA for its use of violence. When he realised that his expected propaganda coup had turned into a rotten tomato for himself, he publicly proclaimed that the delegation had been duped into co-signing the Addis communiqué with the SPLA and committed himself to punishing those responsible for it when the delegation returned. However, any ideas he may have had at the time about publicly punishing the members of the delegation were quashed when in Kampala and Nairobi, Presidents Museveni and Moi, added their approval to the negotiations amid a media fanfare. The later re-naming of the Sudan African Parties to the Union of Sudan African parties (USAP), re-emphasized the unity in the movement that was kindled on the East African trip. This made it much more difficult for Sayed Sadiq to divide their ranks and he had to resort to less obvious methods. It is not too far fetched to think that the Sudan Transitional Charter is part of his plan to devalue the East African Declarations and the new found unity in the USAP. Already, his plan seems to be working as illustrated by the bitter debate that took place over a new chairman for the Council for the South.

Once the Prime Minister had managed to cajole the Southern parties to become signatories to the latest Charter, he immediately set about turning that to his benefit. What had initially appeared as straight forward wording in the Charter suddenly took on an ambiguous impression after the Prime Minister publicly stated his interpretation of what the Charter had stated. He declared that the Southern parties had accepted the principle role of Islam in Sudanese society, including all spheres of social and political life because of the clause in the Charter recognizing that Islam is the religion of the majority in the country. This is completely contrary to the policy positions of most of the Southern parties who have contended that religion, (Christianity, Islam or Animism), is between the individual and his God and not a matter of state or politics. This interpretation of the clause is of course unacceptable to the Southern parties and one that they had not counted upon. Therefore, for the first time in the history of South-North relations in this country it would appear as if the South will renege on an agreement. That is no mean achievement. In the past, it has always been the other way round, with the South accusing the North of violating agreements. If the South is forced to renege, then that could be to the Prime Minister's advantage.

Also in the Charter, the Prime Minister included that the Arab and African elements in this country have an equal role to play. It must have choked him to include this, because he has spent so much time over the past 2 years trying to place the role of the Arab community at centre stage. However, he knew that none of the Southern politicians would have given the document the time of day if it had stated what he really meant. Besides, there are plenty of other ambiguous parts to the document for the Prime Minister to utilize. At the forefront of these were the clauses related to a government of the South and Southern representation in the central government in Khartoum.

Sayed Sadiq made it clear that participation in regional and central government would be based upon the signatories of the charter. The sheepdog barked and the obedient sheep ran into the pen. Nearly all the Southern parties signed the Charter, probably because of a desire to participate in government. As usual though, the Prime Minister's actions after he had achieved what he wanted, namely, to get the Southern parties to sign the document, did not match up to his previous promises nor even to the written clause in the Charter. Although, he has been prepared to consult with the Southern parties over appointments to the regional governments and the central government, he has made it clear that he is not bound to accept any of the individual nominations put forward by the South. The final decision still remains with himself. He may eventually choose non-signatories to the Charter as his appointees. Is it for this that the Southern parties have sold their souls to the Charter?

Even so, the battle of interpretations over this rather hollow and meaningless Charter have yet to be decisive one way or the other. It is anybody's guess as to whose

interpretation will prevail, the Prime Minister's or the Southern parties'. Whatever happens in this respect, one thing is clear: The Sudan Transitional Charter is not the much heralded document that it is being made out to be and is, rather, a dupe for the South on the part of the Prime Minister.

/9604

Southerner Comments on Separatism, Racism
45000039b Khartoum SUDAN TIMES in English
1 Mar 88 p 3

[Article by Zakariya Yei Kual]

[Text] In recent articles in the Arabic press the subject of separatism has been raised by a few individuals who have expressed their personal views on the subject. The first article in the form of a letter published by AL AYYAM daily was written by Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Ageeb, a former Arabic news reporter. This was followed a few weeks later by another letter, this time from a veteran journalist and a founding member of the Graduates Congress, Sayed Ismail El Atabani. In a world which is consolidating itself into bigger units consisting of various different religious and ethnic groups, the question of separatism in one country is most controversial. Now a Sudanese from the South has entered the discussion in AL AYYAM's pages. SUDAN TIMES today publishes a translation of the latest article in the discussion.

A new and strange separatist attitude has recently been covered in the local press, advocating separation of Northern and Southern Sudan, in order that as in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh, both regions can develop.

I am certain that the advocates of that goal ignore the outcome of their attitude.

I am contributing this article in response to an article by the well known journalist and businessman, Mohammed Ahmed Ageeb carried by AL AYYAM on 17.2.1988.

It must be noted that the attitude started to emerge immediately after the April 1985 Uprising, with a series of articles one year ago by an anonymous writer, who preferred to be known as "a national sympathiser."

Now that the "movement" has developed among the people, and is openly deliberated side by side with Sudan's other numerous problems, I should first consider previous occasions on which "attitude" came to the surface.

All rebellions which fought successive national governments advocated separation of the South from the North of Sudan.

The historic separatist movement is deeply rooted. Within a three-phased plan (1898-1947), the colonial administration aimed to sever the North off and then remove Islam from the South, with a majority of Moslem (Egyptian) troops and officials serving in the South, at the time.

Moslems were replaced by Christian Copts. The colonial administration then arranged to attach the South to a confederation of East African states, under the British Crown. Then, concurrent with that, the colonial administration in Sudan issued the "Closed Regions" statute under which Northerners were prohibited from entering the South. Later in 1947, however, the administration reversed its plans when these were found to be impractical in the face of a growing and strong national anti-colonial movement that started with the Congress memorandum of 1942, two significant clauses of which demanded unity for Sudan and the lifting of all barriers to free-trade and movement within Sudan. As well, the colonial administration practically failed to attack and develop the South within an East African confederation. It was also evident that Northerners were intent on investing in the South.

At the Juba Conference of 1947, the administration attempted to remove all barriers, which it created between the North and the South. Southern tribal chiefs and Northern and Southern intellectuals all participated. A common agreement was reached, on a unified Sudan.

Those are the facts. The failure of successive national administrations, plus the separatist movements in the South have both led to the present day problems.

The enormous and deadly mistakes committed by Southern and Northern politicians have created the present dilemmas for Sudan.

The Northerners authoritarian and religious high-browed intellectuals have created a kind of distrust and a subordination complex among Southerners.

Ageeb has fired in the air but Sudanese have long rejected his call for separation: even the movement now fighting the government has learned that separation is totally rejected by Southerners and that a unified Sudan is the only alternative.

When the Addis Ababa Accord was concluded, Dinkas, Zandes, Nuers and Northerners wanted a true peace.

Time has proven that Southerners who rebelled before and after the Accord have a case which the authoritarian Northerners ignore.

Although, I genuinely respect pioneer nationalists, it must be remembered that it was Azhari who altered the Constitution when he was chairman of the State Council, in such a way as to prevent Southerners from becoming Head of the State.

We believe a united Sudan should not forfeit unity unless the Northern Sudanese repatriate Southerners to the South and have a purely Northern government.

It is notable that since independence no Northerner ever spoke of separation, and those who support separation have always been accused of high-treason.

The call for separation has lost all objectivity and logic. It is, hence, irrational to discuss personal opinions which serve no national ends.

The Sudanese are a society made up of tribes which are predominantly ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse. In this context the Southern community is the largest in population and geographic area.

The writer's argument of Bangladesh and Pakistan case, misses the point that India is in the first place a semi-continent with a milliard of a populace. The South Sudan is different in that there are Southern-Northern binding roots that can only be seen by those honest fighters for unity.

I agree with Ageeb on his remarks as regards Southerners' abstention from rejoicing over the return of Gissan and Kurmuk. They did not do so simply because they hate political malignance. It is no proof that Southerners are racialists; contrarily. Northerners proved to be racialists when Rumbek fell to the rebels and residents were killed. Then we heard voices urging a genocide for all Southerners.

Where were you, Ageeb when Myom Nasser, Rumbek, Bor, Tonj and other towns fell? When Wau was butchered?

Where were you and others, when Daien witnessed an unprecedented massacre. Did any Assembly member mourn the victims who died in a railway coaches holocaust?

We are almost convinced with the general Southern opinion that the Northerners have decided to exterminate Southerners-Dinkas in particular.

Southerners fleeing Garang's or Anya Nya (2) forces, affirm that they saw, but could flee, Rizeigat concentration camps for the enslaved (Dr Ushari). The very same Southerners are currently in shanty towns on the outskirts of the National Capital, without any concern provided by Northerners or Southerners, sick and most of them taking to crime.

The Sudanese question is in fact that of status, rather than religion, or separation. We must not disregard the fact that the Sudan's Armed Forces are an amalgamation of Southerners, Westerners, Nubians and Arabs, who are all involved in one trench fight against the SPLA, and not for their conviction of Sudan's unity.

Bringing the call for separation to the surface at this time tends to cancel all efforts to convince Garang of conducting negotiations.

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Tribal Warfare Causes Security Deterioration in Darfur

Refugees Flee to Raga

45000038 Khartoum *GUIDING STAR* in English
25 Feb 88 p 3

[Text] About 10,000 Darfur citizens are reported to have sought refuge in Raga Province of Bahr el Ghazal Region in Southern Sudan.

According to the Umma Party member of the Constituent Assembly for Raga, Hon Abdalla Samad, who disclosed the information in Khartoum to the *GUIDING STAR* reporter Mr Nhial Bol on Monday, 22 February, the Darfur citizens fled their native province because of insecurity and wide-spread famine resulting from the 1985 drought.

The internal 'refugees' are said to be in urgent need of food and accommodation.

Reports say at the moment there is some food for the displaced Darfur citizens in Raga, but that future provision of food is uncertain as Southern Sudan itself is hunger-stricken and plagued with civil war.

Hon Samad has appealed to the Central Government to take direct responsibility of those citizens, adding that he had expressed his thanks to the Commissioner of Raga and asked him to cooperate with the Governor of Darfur Region in resettling the displaced persons.

More Darfur citizens, according to Hon Samad, are expected to flee to Southern Sudan towns in search of water and food for themselves and their animals.

On the food supply situation, Hon Samad claimed the situation has been improved as some food had been transported there.

Because of tribal tension in Bahr el Ghazal and Darfur, Hon Samad has proposed setting up of a committee to visit Raga in order to resettle the Darfur citizens in special camps.

Governor Requests Help
45000038 Khartoum *GUIDING STAR* in English
25 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by Osman Ibrahim: "Dereig's Message Causes Nation-Wide Havoc"]

[Text] The Speech of the former Governor of Darfur, Mr Ahmed Ibrahim Dereig over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio has caused a nation-wide havoc.

Mr Dereig said that the current civil war in the Sudan has caused the insecurity of his region, Darfur and that the present government has not only failed to control the situation but has encouraged the formation of Arab tribal militia against non-Arab tribes in Darfur.

The former governor has called for patriotism in Darfur to counter the barbaric Arab-tribal movement which he termed a racial activity against the Fur nationality.

Mr Dereig called for a peaceful solution to the raging war in the country and urged the political parties and especially the sons of Darfur region to help in bringing about peace to the country.

In a separate but related development it is expected that the Committee of investigation recently formed in the constituent Assembly at the request of one member Honourable Ibrahim Abakar Ibrahim, will start its noble duty in the coming week. The committee is charged to find out the allegation that Dr Modibo signed an agreement with Bin Omer whose forces are threatening peace in Darfur and are opposed to the authorities in Chad.

It has been confirmed by people arriving [in] the national capital, Khartoum, from Darfur that what people call armed banditry has caused insecurity in Darfur. The situation in Darfur is described tense.

Delegate Urges Citizen Action
45000038 Khartoum *GUIDING STAR* in English
3 Mar 88 p 3

[Article by Osman Ibrahim: "Darfur Citizens Want To Liberate Their Region"]

[Text] A delegate from Kabkabeya, Darfur Region, has told a meeting of Darfur citizens that since the Sudan Government had failed to expel foreign troops from Darfur they, the Darfur citizens, should liberate their region from any foreign troops themselves.

The delegate, Hon Mohamed Sherif Mohd Ali, furthermore proposed that the members of the Constituent Assembly from Darfur should tender their joint resignations from the Constituent Assembly and desert their present political parties. He reasoned that the unity of

the citizens of Darfur under one leadership would expedite the liberation of the region from foreign intervention as well as unshackle it from its major problems.

To do that he appealed to the citizens of Darfur to rid themselves from tribalism and to unite in order to defend the region.

As a step to achieve the desired unity, he requested the formation of committees under what he termed voluntary movement to liberate Darfur from foreign intervention. He also suggested a protest demonstration to condemn what is going on in the region.

But other citizens disagreed with the call for the members of the Constituent Assembly to resign from the Assembly. Instead they adopted the proposed demonstration by Darfur citizens in the National Capital to express their grievances to the government.

On the deteriorating security in Darfur, members of the August Constituent Assembly Hon Abdel Jabar, Hon Adam Abdel Karim and Hon Ibrahim Abakar confirmed that the situation in the region has been deteriorating steadily despite government statement to the contrary. They described the government statement denials as irresponsible.

Because of the worsening situation, reports from Kabkabeya say that the citizens there have staged a general strike in all government institutions and commercial centres.

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Editorial Urges Students To Remain Calm
45000039c Khartoum *SUDAN TIMES* in English
2 Mar 88 p 2

[Text] The University of Khartoum reopened on Saturday after a shut down of almost 3 months and there will be few who will not welcome this development and hope that the academic year can now be completed without further interruption. But the hope that that prospect can be fulfilled largely lies in the hands of the National Islamic Front dominated student union which created the mayhem on the campus that brought about the university closure.

Indeed the university's Vice Chancellor, Professor Yousef Fadal, had little option but to order the closure given the anger and resentment of the faculty who increasingly saw themselves as being targets of a NIF orchestrated campaign of vilification that included class disruptions and personal insults. But if the lecturers were the focus of the attack there is little doubt that those who suffered most from the disruption and closure were the militants' fellow students who have been denied the privilege of pursuing their education.

It is significant that despite the lecturers' resentment with the militant student activities that even before the university's closure they went out of their way to defend student political rights and affirm academic freedom. And this point must be stressed: the issue here is not one of denying or even restricting the students' democratic rights to pursue political objectives, either within the university or in the Sudanese community at large. The issue instead is one of the need for tolerance and a recognition that no single component part of the university has the right to interfere or deny the rights of other sections of the university.

Far better that this principle be accepted by all concerned and not have to be reinforced by a regime of rules and regulations. But the failure of the militant students to recognize the need for tolerance and restraint has led to the formulation of a set of rules of student conduct that does not, we believe, restrict their democratic liberties, but does force them to take heed of the rights of others. These rules pertain to the use of loudspeakers, wall newspapers and the holding of political rallies at the student club. They seem eminently reasonable and embody the democratic values of the university and the country in the post April Uprising period. As such, we are confident that the code will receive the endorsement of the entire university, including the student union. First reports suggest that the union has tempered its earlier provocative approach and has demonstrated a measure of conciliation that at least gives rise to a constrained optimism. There is, however, little doubt that while the university administration may see fit to compromise on its code of conduct, it will not back down and it is quite prepared to close the university again if there are any indications that the students are not complying with the new regime. Furthermore, the administration will have our support, and we believe that of the entire country, if they are forced to make such a decision.

But to end our discussion, we want to reiterate our conviction that university students, who have long played an active, and for the most part progressive role in the politics of the nation, should continue to do so. But the pursuit of political goals must go hand-in-hand with political education and a key element in that education should be a respect for the values of democracy, such as tolerance and appreciation of the rights of others.

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SYRIA

Government Implements Industrial Agreement With USSR
44040135a Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
28 Feb 88 p 4

[Text] Minister of Industry Antun Jubran yesterday received the minister for economic affairs at the Soviet

Embassy in Damascus. Present were the deputy minister of industry, the director of the General Authority for Cement and Construction Material, and the commercial attache at the embassy.

The conferees, guided by the transcripts of discussions in Moscow earlier this month between representatives of the Soviet Union and officials of the industrial public sector in Syria, agreed on a timetable for implementation of the industrial cooperation protocol signed by the two countries last October.

According to the timetable, minister Jubran said, seven Soviet working groups will come to the Syrian Arab Republic to make the studies and sign the contracts needed to begin implementing the program agreed upon for industrial cooperation in such sectors as weaving, textiles, tires, batteries, electric motors, bakeries, etc.

12945/9738

New Measures Aim To Promote Industry, Agriculture

44040135b Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic
28 Jan 88 p 2

[Text] The committee for the rationalization of imports, exports, and consumption headed by prime minister Mahmud al-Zughbi, adopted at its last meeting a number of fiscal and economic measures dealing with important issues of productivity and export. The action would extend various facilities to importers and satisfy the requirements of a number of domestic industries that help meet the country's needs.

The minister of economy and foreign trade gave the following guidelines for the various resolutions and measures adopted.

He asserted that the ministry of economy and foreign trade has already adopted the needed procedures whose main objective is to stimulate the role of domestic industry in bolstering national economy, to foster means of cooperation between public and private sectors, and promote the export of domestic products through more effective and direct measures.

He added that all recent resolutions and regulations have the basic objective of increasing industrial and agricultural productivity in order to make consumer goods adequately available and also to encourage the export of agricultural and industrial surplus to increase national foreign exchange income and provide capital projects with raw material and other requirements.

He explained the new provisions:

1. Establish 180-day lines of credit for the import of farm tractors of 50 hp or less, harvesters, plows, tractor tires, and farm vaccines and pesticides. This credit facility does not require cash loans or security payments to the

Syrian Commercial Bank or the payment of any commission to the department of monopoly. It is now allowed to import from Lebanon agricultural machinery and equipment as well as all kinds of fodder and relevant concentrates. This is an exception from regulations covering direct import from the country of origin. Fodders and concentrates imported since the beginning of the year are valued at more than 20 million Syrian pounds. Farm equipment imported during the same period are tabulated at 2,622 tractors, 1,312 plows, 201 harvesters, and 300 cultivators.

2. Provide 180-day lines of credit for the import of mobile rotary drills on condition that the equipment is not passed on to another owner for at least five years from the date of entry.

3. In order to tap public sector productive potential, the private sector is allowed to finance the credit necessary for the import of plastic housing components such as metal supports, pipes, heating equipment, boilers, and plastic granules which would be manufactured for them by the public sector in accordance with guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Industry with participation from the Syrian Commercial Bank.

4. In order to bolster industrial output, meet local demand, and realize an exportable surplus, instructions have been issued to implement a decision by the prime minister to issue registered factory owners lines of credit for the import of raw materials, spare parts, and other needs provided that 50 percent of the price is paid for by the Syrian Commercial Bank in Syrian pounds at the time shipping documents are received by the importer. It has also been decided to exempt the above industrial imports from the requirement for deposits and cash loans.

5. Credits of 180-day duration are also to be made available to the private sector for the import of agricultural and industrial raw materials, components, spare parts, and other requirements as well of medical, scientific, and laboratory instruments and equipment. Originally licensed owners of washing machine factories are also being allowed to underwrite letters of credit for the import of raw materials needed by the public sector for the manufacture of two-speed electric motors. Guidelines are issued by the Ministry of Industry in coordination with the Syrian Commercial Bank.

6. To increase industrial output and export domestic surplus in order to ensure the foreign exchange needed for capital imports, the prime minister has decided, and the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade has instructed, that private sector industrialists be allowed to keep 50 percent of the foreign exchange they earn on exports they arrange. These funds will be deposited in special export accounts to pay for their imports of raw materials, spare parts, and capital goods.

7. Private sector exporters are now permitted to keep 75 percent of the return on their industrial and agricultural exports as outlined in decree 279. The funds are to be used for the import of certain materials and products specified in the same decree.

8. Ready-to-wear manufacturers can benefit from the prime minister's Decree 1953 and amendments by importing up to 50 percent of the fabrics needed to fill their production quotas as determined by the Ministry of Industry or its authorized agents. This is covered by items 4-51, 7-56, and 9-55 allowing the ready-to-wear industry, within Ministry of Industry guidelines, access to 180-day credits exempt from deposit and loan requirements. These manufacturers are also given the benefits of prime minister's decree 595 and ministry regulation 279 allowing them to retain 75 percent of the return on their exports for the import of fabrics needed for their factories.

12945/9738

TUNISIA

AIDS Testing Ordered for Emigrants to Libya
45190037a Tunis LE TEMPS in French 18 Feb 88 p 2

[Article by S.B. M'barek]

[Text] For a certainty, those seeking to emigrate to Libya have not seen the end of their troubles. Since relations between Tunisia and Libya were normalized, and above all, since the elimination of entry visas by the two countries, we have seen a veritable dash toward the frontier by young people whose sole purpose is to obtain work and settle in this neighboring country, which many say "has lost much of its economic influence."

Before they ever reach the frontier, these young people are distressed and dismayed by the most extravagant rumors about the tourist quota and the test for AIDS. While the first matter has been settled (a Tunisian is allowed into Libya with the equivalent of 200 dinars in foreign exchange), the AIDS test issue remains problematical.

In fact, despite the reports from the Tunisian-Libyan frontier to the effect that certification that one is free of AIDS is not compulsory for Tunisian travelers entering Libyan territory, candidates for emigration to Libya are rushing to specialized agencies to take this test. For in the final analysis, Tunisians prefer to take the risk of paying the cost of this test rather than that of being rejected at the frontier for lack of it, with all that the trip involves, including fatigue, expense, the wait, etc.

Whatever It Takes

In other words, despite the statements carried in more or less all the newspapers, "The Libyan authorities are asking Tunisians to show proof of AIDS testing before crossing the frontier," according to Tunisians returning from Ben Guerdane.

With both the Libyan consulate in Tunis and the Tunisian authorities maintaining total silence about this issue, these reports are being brought back to Tunis by "those returning from the frontier to take the famous AIDS test demanded by Libya." And so these thousands of young people, who appear dejected but determined to do whatever it takes to obtain passage to Libya, are besieging the hospitals and specialized health agencies.

A brief visit to the Pasteur Institute is enlightening in this connection. A dense crowd of people awaits entry while others line up, sleeves rolled back, ready for the "blood sampling." At the door, three nurses, papers in hand, call patients in and issue the certificates to the persons tested, who have been waiting for 3 days.

Only a Formality

"It is bizarre," a nurse remarked. "These poor people are in such a hurry that they do not even take the trouble to see from the results of the tests whether they have the AIDS virus or not." This is true. Proof that they have taken the test is for them a formality and nothing more. As time passes, others arrive with the same desire to take the test as quickly as possible. These people come from everywhere—Jendouba, Kef, Kairouan, Gabes, Sfax, Tozeur and many other distant regions.

For them the most important thing is not to lose time. Yet another day costs money, and their pocketbooks do not allow any "extra" expenditures.

At the Institute, all employees are on duty in order to meet the demand. Work goes on almost all day and sometimes into the night. In his office, where he talked with me, Mr Ali Arrouji, the pharmacist and biologist who is in charge of the virology department at the Pasteur Institute, was signing an order for a thousand syringes needed by the department. Mr Arrouji acknowledged that "The department is a little overwhelmed by the number of applicants, but things are proceeding normally and our sole concern is to satisfy everyone."

No AIDS Cases

"It is true that there are some problems—people in a hurry who want to get away immediately. But we for our part are doing our work under optimal conditions, ranging from the first immune enzyme test to the Western Blot, the last stage in the analysis, which confirms 100 percent whether the patient is serum positive." Mr

Arrouji revealed that among the 1,500 persons tested, no cases of AIDS have been found, which provides a preliminary indication that our young people are healthy.

Mr Arrouji said that the Institute has all of the equipment it requires to do honor to its historic reputation and that it has also benefited from strong interest on the part of the national commission for combating AIDS. This places this agency, along with the other hospital institutions, in the front line of the national concern with the battle to eliminate this scourge. On the subject of the 1,500 persons reported tested for AIDS, we were told at the Institute that the total will reach 2,000 by the end of the campaign.

At Charles Nicole, the situation is very similar, but with a small, or perhaps a great, advantage, however. Travelers can have the test free there by making a donation to the blood bank. In view of the posted charge at the Pasteur Institute, which is 16D,100, some people prefer to sacrifice a "flask" of blood rather than pay this sum and, some say, in order to obtain a certificate the same day, whereas the Institute, where the analyses are done in groups, requires a minimum wait of 3 days.

A Perilous Venture

Be that as it may, one thing is certain. A certificate that one is serum negative represents another passport for those Tunisians desiring to travel to Libya. That the Tunisian authorities are maintaining silence about these departures, which the National Office for Tunisian Workers Abroad and Vocational Training has described as "barbarous," remains puzzling. But it is nonetheless necessary to aid these people, to facilitate their departure, and to find a method so that this will not be a perilous venture from which our fellow citizens will certainly suffer.

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Analysis Reveals Drought Crisis in Le Kef Farm Sector

45190037b Tunis LE TEMPS in French 24 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by C.M.: "Drought Situation Alarming in Certain Regions"]

[Text] Drought prevails, and is posing serious problems for the crop raisers and livestock breeders, particularly in the Center, Center-West and Center-South regions, and even in others which are generally better served by the infrequent rainfall.

Veteran farmers state that the drought this year has had no parallel in the last half century.

The government has adopted urgent measures to cope with the consequences of the drought.

Pending the application of these measures, we "took the agricultural pulse" in one region—the governorate of Le Kef.

Agriculture in that area is severely threatened. Mr Med Salah Khammassi, heads the Vegetable Production District, was good enough to discuss the farming situation in the governorate with us.

The Figures and the Problems

The rainfall was both irregular and insufficient in quantity. Only 47 millimeters (the average is 100) was received in the southern part of the governorate. The situation farther to the north, where 130 millimeters was received (the average is 200), was better.

But as troubles never come singly, the current season has been characterized by another weather phenomenon which has aggravated the situation—the abundance of frost. There were 18 days of frost recorded. The effects were negative, above all, for the grain, truck garden and leguminous crops, not to mention the secondary effects of the frost on livestock production. The irrigated areas were also affected by this long dearth of rainfall, since the water table diminished considerably, causing difficulties in irrigating.

Three Different Situations

For nonirrigated crops (the major ones), we can see that there are three different situations, or rather zones, in the Le Kef region.

In the northern sector, which accounts for 25 percent of the total area planted to grain, the harvest is consistent and the developmental stage relatively well along, into full sprouting and the end of that process.

Thus in the northern sector, the season is normal, although, of course it cannot be compared with the 1986-87 season, which was truly exceptional.

As to the central part of the governorate (Sers, Le Kef, and the northern part of Tajerouine), the harvest is good but the stage of development not as well advanced as that to the north.

For the balance of the region—the southern and central-western parts (Garn Halfaya, Sidi Rabah, Ain Al Karma), which account for 40 percent of the total area planted to grain—there have been heavy losses. More than 50 percent of the grain crops have withered for lack of water.

This is the most seriously damaged zone, for if it does not rain between now and the end of February, the crops will be totally doomed. In other words, there will be no harvest. In the central part of the governorate, given the

same hypothesis, two thirds of the harvest will be lost. Again under the same conditions, the northern sector might lose a half of the average harvest volume.

The Steps To Be Taken

The farmers raising crops in the northern zone should undertake a weeding effort and the surface spreading of ammonium nitrate. The use of only a half of the usual dosage for the sprouting season (25 kilograms per hectare instead of 50) is advised. The use of this chemical fertilizer will enable the grain heads to reach normal size, so that harvesting combines can be used.

Grain Substitutes

A number of measures have been adopted by the Ministry of Agricultural Foodstuff Production in order to compensate for the deficit expected in grain production. These measures include an increase in the production of tomatoes in season. With a view to balancing our farm exports, the national goal for fresh tomatoes will be increased from 450,000 tons to 550,000 tons.

Where Le Kef is concerned, the area to be planted will be increased from 900 to 1,000 hectares, and the regional production goal for tomatoes will be increased from 13,200 to 14,700 tons, based on intensification, fertilization and processing. We should note that in order to encourage farmers to raise tomatoes, the price per kilogram for tomatoes for canning has been increased by 5 millimes (from 60 to 65).

Another incentive measure was adopted in connection with the potato-growing season. The Interprofessional Vegetable Group (GIL) will guarantee the marketing of production at a minimum price of 260 millimes per kilogram at the purchasing centers which will be opened during the harvest season.

These measures have encouraged the farmers in Le Kef to undertake the raising of potatoes. However, the region has received only 50 tons of seed, while the demand exceeds that figure.

Melons for Ramadan

Fruit growers, for their part, have not been spared damage from the drought, either. The estimated harvest totals are less than half of the average volume produced. As a result, the national officials have decided to encourage farmers to raise hothouse melons (we should note that this kind of cultivation had been abandoned by the farmers). Aware of the situation on the fruit market, where there will be a limited supply, particularly during the coming Ramadan season, farmers are ready to undertake raising hothouse melons, the marketing of which will be guaranteed.

Protecting Livestock Herds

In order to safeguard the livestock against the effects of the drought, 515 hectares of irrigated forage crops (corn, sorghum and alfalfa) are planned, with 50 percent of the seeds subsidized.

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Draft Educational Reform Bill Published *45190037c Tunis LE TEMPS in French 16 Feb 88 p 3*

[Text] The reform of the national educational system is one of the main priorities in the policy of the government and one of the great concerns of the public in this nation. After 30 years of experience following the 1958 law, which is today largely outmoded, it is time to derive the lessons to be learned from this experience and to move forward to a revision in depth of our education policy. This policy must be viewed in the light of the current status of our educational system, which is burdened by heterogeneous and inappropriate regulations, and in the light of the new challenges which face us because of the scientific and technological changes which have occurred and the demands of economic, social and cultural development in the coming decades.

The Basic Principles

Reflection on our educational experience in these last 30 years, the results thereof and the current problems, and also a comparison with foreign experience, in both its positive and negative aspects, suggests certain basic principles about which there is a consensus in the national agencies involved and in the opinion of the vast majority of the people. These basic principles can be set forth in terms of the need to do the following:

(1) To ensure the advancement of the Tunisian citizen and our national culture, based on the requirements of authenticity and modernity.

(2) To confirm the democratic nature of the educational system, representing a national choice as of the time independence was won, the implementation of which is continuing. This is a basic prerequisite for raising the cultural and educational level of the nation as a whole and for the training, on all levels, of the elite which our country needs.

(3) To ensure social justice, in the sense that the educational system should provide everyone, according to his aptitude, with an opportunity for access to education and social advancement.

In order to implement this principle, it is necessary first of all to guarantee all children a basic level of education, and then to make education available beyond that basic level on the basis of aptitude and vocation.

(4) To allow the continuing adaptation of the education and training policy to the present and anticipated needs of our country.

Ways and Means

The achievement of these overall goals requires the implementation of a certain number of measures, which can be set forth as follows:

(1) Reaching agreement among all of the national bodies involved on the concept of educational work, and their effective involvement in its implementation.

(2) Placing responsibility with all the members of the national collective, the teachers and students first and foremost, for the concrete implementation of this educational and training project.

(3) Making the national educational undertaking profitable by improving the internal and external yield of educational activities and by rationalizing the use of the human, financial and material resources put to use.

(4) Continuous improvement of the teaching programs and their pedagogical support with a view to adapting them to the new achievements in science and the needs of the environment.

(5) The training of teachers and advancement of scientific research as a tool of national development.

(6) The involvement of public and private institutions in the achievement of the goals of the educational project, while at the same time ensuring the level and quality of the teaching provided, through state control.

The Orientation Law

The juridical framework allowing the implementation of this policy must, according to the dictates of the constitution, be based on:

—An orientation law setting forth the basic principles for this reform over the long term; and

—Decrees and other regulatory texts pertaining to the specific application of these principles and their continuous adaptation.

The basic principles in the reorganization of our educational system can be grouped in chapters, as follows:

Chapter I. Administrative Organization of the Educational System

The main responsibility for the organization of the educational system should fall to the Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research. It is the duty of this ministry to undertake the task of conceiving, coordinating and controlling the various establishments responsible for educational and research work.

It must also ensure the existence of a National Council on Education and Scientific Research, an advisory body with the task of aiding the minister in the implementation of his work, its conceptual aspect in particular.

On the middle level, there is a need:

(1) To consolidate the organization of higher education in the universities, and to provide for extending them gradually on the national level, as a function of the need. The problem which then arises is the precise establishment of the criteria which will govern the establishment and distribution of the universities, whether multidisciplinary regional universities or national universities which are predominantly sectorial.

(2) To establish decentralized units called academies gradually, for the secondary and primary levels of education.

The universities and academies will be organized on the basis of a broad and real autonomy defined by a suitable juridical framework.

The universities and academies will come under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research, in accordance with the new modalities designed to take the new decentralized units into account.

Chapter II. The First Educational Level and the Basic Schools

The first educational level affects the vast majority of the school population. The reform of this educational level can be carried out on the basis of the establishment of basic schools with nine grades, corresponding to the current primary level and the initial years of secondary education.

This system will have the advantage of guaranteeing children a desirable basic educational level while at the same time providing training in the practical meaning of things and developing a sense of responsibility.

The basic schools will also make it possible to increase the internal yield of education by eliminating the undesirable aspects of the present system, which fail to provide solutions for the students who do not pass the competitive examinations on the sixth-grade level.

At the end of 9 years of basic schooling, each young person can, depending on his qualifications:

—Gain admission to a newly established secondary school (see below); or

—Gain admission to a vocational school for final training, but which will also, for the highest achievers, provide a step leading to acceptance at a secondary educational establishment of the new sort.

The students who do not succeed in completing the basic level of education will be channeled into vocational apprenticeships, which will also provide a bridge allowing the highest achievers to reenter vocational education.

It should be noted that the establishment of this system will require profound changes in the current structure of the primary schools and the private and public secondary schools, as well as the redistribution of the current resources in terms of personnel and equipment and a notable increase in these human and material resources.

Also, and taking these difficulties into account, the establishment of basic schools on the basis of progressive methods and as a function of the available possibilities could be contemplated.

Chapter III. The Secondary Educational Level and the Baccalaureate

The Secondary Educational Level

With the establishment of the basic schools, the secondary educational level will take on a new form, since it will correspond to the present second cycle in secondary education.

With the new formula, secondary education will affect students who have achieved a much more homogeneous level of studies and aptitudes than under the current system, and as a result, the internal profitability of this cycle will be considerably improved.

Two versions of this new secondary educational level are contemplated:

—General secondary education; and

—Technical secondary education.

The establishment of a vocational training cycle should also be contemplated.

(1) General Secondary Education

The most suitable solution for the organization of general secondary education will be a combination of ordinary general training in a first stage, and specific training in a second stage.

(2) Technical Secondary Education

This form of education will combine specific technical training and general training in the humanities and literary disciplines.

The curricula, within this form, will be especially adapted to guarantee the training of operational technical agents and to provide preparation for higher technical studies (engineering schools in particular).

(3) Vocational Education

Vocational training, which is designed to serve students who are not accepted for secondary education, seeks to develop a specialized vocational aptitude. This will be made possible in the trade schools, which will also, for the highest achievers, provide access to technical secondary education.

(B) The Baccalaureate

The general and technical secondary educational levels will lead to a general or technical baccalaureate certificate, one or the other being specified, following the specific training provided in the course of the last years of these educational cycles.

The baccalaureate certifies to completion of the secondary educational cycle, and provides access to higher education in accordance with the provisions set forth below (see Chapter IV).

Students who do not receive the baccalaureate certificate nonetheless retain the option of taking the examination again, and they are also eligible for acceptance for suitable specialized training which will give them ready access to the labor market.

Chapter IV. Higher Education and Scientific Research

(A) Preparation for Higher Education

With a view to guaranteeing holders of the baccalaureate the best chance of success on the higher educational level, and to reduce the worrisome rate of failure on the level of the first university cycle, there is a need to provide a year of preparatory training, which should be offered by the universities or by groups of establishments providing instruction in related disciplines.

(B) The Organization of Higher Education

(1) At the end of the preparatory year, the student will have access, in accordance with his aptitudes, to:

(a) A long educational chain, organized in successive cycles based on the specific requirements of each discipline established by the universities. This may lead to the third cycle.

(b) A short educational chain, leading to a certificate of completion. This chain will involve an access system allowing the best achievers to matriculate in the long chains.

(2) At the end of the long chain, the students who have demonstrated an outstanding aptitude for research will have access to the third cycle.

Because of its special importance for the training of future higher cadres, teachers and researchers, particular attention should be devoted to this third higher educational cycle.

First of all, it is recommended that the organization of the third cycle studies be coordinated on the level of all the university institutions. To this end, an adaptation system approved by the ministry should be planned.

The third cycle should take two forms—academic and specialized.

(a) The Third Academic Cycle

The third academic cycle should be restricted to holders of the diploma issued on completion of the highest second cycle in the discipline in question who have shown an aptitude for research.

Teaching personnel should be selected on the basis of aptitude for creating and organizing teaching and research methods.

(b) The Third Specialized Cycle

It would be highly desirable to organize a third specialized cycle, with its own framework, designed to perfect the final training of candidates as a function of the requirements of the specialty and job demands. This third specialized cycle should be organized in close collaboration with the professional bodies. Such collaboration would also serve the purpose of establishing a relationship between the universities and the environment.

(c) Scientific Research

University education is inconceivable without scientific research. Such research is also an absolute prerequisite if the universities are to make a contribution to the general development of the country.

With a view to organizing this task, it is necessary:

—To consolidate the present scientific research establishments.

—To plan for their extension or the establishment of new institutions, as the need develops.

—To establish planning for research to be undertaken, within the framework of the national development plan.

—To provide the means for realizing and popularizing these goals.

(d) Ongoing Training

With a view to guaranteeing social advancement both for administrative employees and those of public or private enterprises, there is a need to ensure effective application of the legislative or regulatory provisions in effect, so as to guarantee the ongoing training of and refresher courses for this personnel. The universities are in a position to undertake this task because of the human and material resources available to them.

Chapter V. Teaching Personnel

In order to enable teaching personnel to carry out their task of implementing the new reform of the educational system, the orientation law should provide for a certain number of measures, designed in particular:

—To guarantee the training and continuous retraining of teaching personnel on all levels.

—To establish a system for evaluation which will dictate the development of the career of the teacher, as well as the functions which will be entrusted to him.

—To review recruiting conditions, in order to attract the best candidates and to ensure access to teaching functions for the most apt. This principle, which is general in scope, should for higher education in particular lead to a reduction in the current number of categories and make the methods of recruiting teaching candidates more flexible.

—To define the general rules of professional ethics and to ensure respect for them.

Chapter VI. Private Education

Private education has existed in Tunisia since 1958. But because of the inadequate guarantees provided by the law, this sector has been characterized by multiple deviations, which in some cases have reduced it to a mere effort to accommodate the students excluded from public education.

There is a need to review the role of private education. It should play an effective role along with the public establishments in the execution of the tasks of the educational system.

In this connection, private education should meet the following conditions:

—The first has to do with the scientific and pedagogical level. To ensure a higher level, the establishment of private educational institutions will be subject to approval. Their curricula, courses of study and access for their students to national (public educational) examinations will be established on the basis of agreements signed by the ministry with the private educational institutions.

—The second condition has to do with the quality of teaching personnel. The recruiting of such personnel should be governed by adequate guarantees of professional qualification and level.

—The third condition has to do with the financing of private educational and research establishments. A specific investment code should provide for state control of the financing sources, while at the same time allowing private enterprise to establish educational and research institutions on all levels.

This code should also provide financial and fiscal incentives for these institutions. Such are justified by the public service mission in which they play a role under the control of the state.

Chapter VII. Financing of the Educational System

The implementation of this reform will lead to a revision of the overall system of financing educational undertakings.

The present reform has the advantage of introducing a major rationalization into the management of the resources already available, and making the resources to which the public educational institutions have access more profitable.

But in another connection, the reform will certainly have the result of encouraging the mobilization of new financial resources.

Since the educational task is a priority mission of the nation, the effective participation of all citizens and agencies in covering the cost, consistent with their respective capacities, becomes imperative.

Basic schooling is free. But because of the additional resources the implementation of the new educational reform will require, it will be necessary, within the appropriate framework, to define the modalities for distributing this financial burden among the state, the public and private institutions and the members of the national collective, with respect for the principle of social justice.

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Text of Draft Constitutional Amendment

Published

45190038a Tunis LE TEMPS in French 23 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] In accordance with the statement made by the president of the republic, Mr Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali, on 7 November 1987, a proposed amendment to the constitution has been drafted. Its various provisions are as follows:

1. Concerning the name "Chamber of Deputies."

Resumption of the earlier name, i.e., "National Assembly."

Thus the new proposed article would read as follows:

"Article 1. The name 'Chamber of Deputies' will be replaced by the name 'National Assembly' in Articles 2, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 42, 46, 48, 49, 52, 56, 61, 70, 72 and 73 of the Constitution."

2. Concerning the age requirement for candidates for National Assembly seats.

In order to provide young people with access to the institutions of the state, the president of the republic decided to lower the age requirement for candidates from 28 to 25.

As a result, the new Article 21 will provide that any citizen born of a Tunisian father and 25 years of age or older will be eligible to serve in the National Assembly.

3. Ratification of the organic laws.

According to Article 28 of the Constitution, organic laws must be ratified by two thirds of the membership of the Assembly.

However, in constitutions implementing political pluralism, only an absolute majority is required.

And as of the time pluralism was endorsed by the 7 November declaration, an absolute majority could suffice.

As a result, the new Article 28 will read as follows:

"The National Assembly exercises legislative power. The initiative with regard to laws falls concurrently to the president of the republic and the members of the Assembly, and the drafts submitted by the president will have priority.

"The National Assembly may authorize the president of the republic, for a limited time and with a specified goal in mind, to issue decree-laws, which must be submitted to the Assembly for ratification at the end of that specified period.

"The National Assembly approves the organic law. Its draft cannot be submitted to the Assembly for discussion until the end of a 15-day period following its filing. An absolute majority is required for its approval.

"The laws for which Articles 4, 8, 10, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71 of the Constitution provide have the status of organic laws.

"The electoral law enjoys the status of an organic law.

"The National Assembly will approve draft finance laws and laws regulating the budget under the conditions set forth in the organic budget law.

"The budget must be approved by 31 December at the latest. If by that date the National Assembly has made no decision, the provisions of the draft finance laws may be put into effect by decree, for renewable quarterly periods."

4. Article 39 and the office of president of the republic.

(a) In accordance with the 7 November statement, there will no longer be a lifelong term for the president. This is the reason the last paragraph in Article 39 of the Constitution must be rescinded.

(b) Article 3 sets no limit on the number of candidates for the presidency.

However, since this paragraph is inconsistent with the 7 November statement, it becomes necessary to amend it and to specify the number of candidates. In the initial 1959 text, the number was three, but a limit of only two could be set.

(c) In order to prevent the presidential election from overlapping with that for the Parliament, the extension of the presidential term by 1 year is advisable.

The new text would thus read as follows.

New Article 39. "The president of the republic will be elected for 6 years by universal, free, direct and secret balloting in the course of the last 30 days of the term and under the conditions specified in the electoral law.

"In the event that it is impossible to hold the elections at the proper time because of war or imminent peril, the term of the president will be extended by law until such time as it is possible to hold elections.

"The president of the republic can run as a candidate two successive times."

5. Candidacy for the office of president of the republic.

(a) Paragraph 1 of Article 40 requires that any candidate for the office of president must be a Muslim born of a Tunisian father and a Tunisian paternal grandfather, and all three must have retained continuous Tunisian nationality.

In the knowledge that this paragraph was drafted under special conditions, it would be well to require that both father and mother as well as grandfather be of Tunisian nationality.

(b) Paragraph 2 of Article 40 provides that a candidate must also be at least 40 years of age and in full possession of all civil rights. In order to prevent embarrassing situations involving advanced age, it is therefore desirable to establish an upper limit for candidacy at 70 years of age.

(c) Paragraph 5 of Article 40 provides that candidates must register as such in a special registry before a commission made up of the president of the Chamber of Deputies, the president and five members, the mufti of the republic, the first president of the Court of Appeals and the first president of the Administrative Court.

As a result, the new Article 40 will read as follows.

"Any Tunisian citizen of the Muslim religion whose father and mother and paternal grandfather are Tunisian citizens and have continuously retained Tunisian nationality may run as a candidate for the office of president of the republic.

"Candidates must, in addition, be at least 40 years of age and no more than 70, and in full possession of all civic rights.

"Candidates will be nominated by elected officials in accordance with the methods and conditions established by the electoral law.

"Candidates must be registered as such in a special register before a commission made up of the president of the National Assembly, aided by five members, the minister of justice, the president of the Constitutional Council, the mufti of the republic, the first president of the Court of Appeals and the first president of the Administrative Court.

"The commission will rule on the validity of the candidacies and will announce the results of the balloting."

6. Vacancy in the office of president of the republic.

The 7 November statement makes it clear that there is no longer any question of an automatic succession. Based on this principle, the new Article 57 will read as follows:

New Article 57. "In the event that the office of president of the republic as a result of death, resignation or absolute incapacity to act, the president of the National Assembly will immediately be invested with the functions of the office of president of the republic for a period of no less than 5 days and no more than 60 days. He will take the constitutional oath for which Article 42 of the Constitution provides before the Assembly or the bureau of the National Assembly. An official performing the presidential functions on a provisional basis cannot run as a candidate for the presidency, even if he resigns.

"During this period, he can carry out the duties of the president. However, he may not have recourse to a plebiscite, suspend the functions of the government, dissolve the National Assembly or promulgate the exceptional measures for which Article 46 provides.

"In addition, during this same period, elections must be organized for the purpose of electing a president for a 6-year term.

"The president of the republic may dissolve the National Assembly and convoke early legislative elections in accordance with the provisions of the paragraph in Article 63."

7. Pertaining to the motion of censure.

Article 62 of the Constitution provides that the National Assembly controls the implementation by the government of the policy defined by the president of the republic.

The National Assembly may draw the attention of the president of the republic to government activities by means of a justified resolution approved by an absolute majority of the deputies.

In such a case, the prime minister must submit the resignation of the cabinet members to the president of the republic.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 63, the president of the republic may, instead of accepting the resignation of the cabinet, have recourse to the dissolution of the Parliament and the convocation of new elections.

The newly elected assembly may draft a new motion of censure, which will be presented during its first session.

If this motion is approved, the president of the republic must submit his resignation.

But whenever a conflict develops between the cabinet and the Assembly, with the result that the president may find himself required to submit his resignation, the president must be removed from this conflict, and the principle of the motion of censure and the possibility of dissolving the Parliament must be maintained.

On this basis, the text of Articles 62 and 63 would be as follows.

New Article 62. "The Assembly controls the cabinet.

"The Assembly can raise the issue of cabinet responsibility by approving a motion of censure.

"A motion of censure will not be valid unless it is justified and signed by at least a half of the members of the Assembly.

"No vote can be taken until 48 hours have passed after the filing of the motion of censure."

"When a motion of censure is approved by a two-thirds majority of the deputies, the prime minister must submit the resignation of the members of the cabinet to the president of the republic."

New Article 63. "If the deputies approve a motion of censure, the president of the republic may dissolve the Assembly, after consultation with the prime minister and the president of the National Assembly."

"The decree dissolving the Assembly must include a convocation of the voters for new elections within a maximum of 30 days."

"In the event that a dissolution is decreed under the conditions set forth in the first paragraph of this article, the president of the republic may promulgate decree-laws, which must subsequently be submitted to the Assembly for ratification."

"The newly elected Assembly will meet with full authority within the 10 days following the announcement of the results of the balloting."

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Dire Effects of Drought on Agriculture Explained 45190038b Tunis LE TEMPS in French 19 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by S.B.R.: "Drought Sounds the Alarm"]

[Text] The 1987-1988 farm year will mark an era in the annals of drought in Tunisia. Mr Hamadi Trabelsi, director of the National Meteorological Institute, does not conceal his pessimism.

Tunisia is a country in which the semi-arid climate is characterized by irregular, erratic and poorly distributed rainfall from season to season. In fact, this year inadequate rainfall is an almost general situation throughout the whole of the country, and it has reached alarming dimensions in the Center and the North. In other words, the drought has become a seriously worrisome, and even anguishing, phenomenon.

On the threshold of spring and with the end of the rainy season only 2 months away, there can be no doubt that the farm season is henceforth compromised.

Mr Hamadi Trabelsi, director of the National Meteorological Institute, explains this situation scientifically and statistically. "In Tunisia, inadequate rainfall is cyclical. The cycle repeats itself every 2 years. This phenomenon is mainly linked with solar activity."

| | Cumulative (CR) | Rain- fall | Nor- mal | Nor- mal % | CR | % |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|-------|---|
| | | S.O.N.D.J + 1.2 | | 1.986 | 22.87 | |
| Bizerte | 167.2 | 518.4 | 32% | 614.2 | 110% | |
| Béja | 203.8 | 450.9 | 45% | 470 | 95% | |
| Aïn-Draham | 597.8 | 1091.1 | 54% | 1427 | 121% | |
| Tunis | 180 | 314.4 | 57% | 519.7 | 154% | |
| Nabeul | 74.4 | 282.5 | 26% | 402.9 | 134% | |
| Siliana | 85.6 | 246.2 | 34% | 160.8 | 61% | |
| Kairouan | 50.8 | 170.1 | 29% | 201.4 | 111% | |
| Kef | 95.8 | 313.7 | 30% | 317.4 | 93% | |
| Thala | 114 | 245 | 46% | 332.2 | 125% | |
| Sidi Bouzid | 40.6 | 118.6 | 34% | 155.3 | 113% | |
| Sousse | 118.5 | 201.4 | 58% | 349.6 | 163% | |
| Sfax | 45.1 | 242.3 | 18% | 162.3 | 111% | |
| Gafsa | 41.1 | 90.6 | 45% | 164.2 | 168% | |
| Médenine | 207.6 | 100.8 | 2.05% | " | " | |
| Gabès | 106.8 | 134.6 | 76% | " | " | |
| Ben Guerdane | 341.3 | 100.8 | 271% | " | " | |

The table below is enlightening in this connection. It shows the cumulative rainfall recorded from 1 September 1987 to 15 February 1988 at the main stations in the country, in a comparison with that recorded for the same period last year.

This table also reveals the catastrophic situation into which the country has been plunged.

Paradoxically, this situation can be seen to be substantially better in the southeastern region of the country.

In fact, the autumn brought inadequate rainfall to the northern area but a surplus to the southeastern region. Rainfall exceeded the normal levels (the average rainfall calculated over a period of 30 years) in Gabes, Beni Guerdane and Medenine, while the southwestern region did not have the benefit of this manna.

The same is true for the Sahel and the central region of the country, where rainfall did not exceed 30 or 35 percent of the normal volume.

In measuring the scope of the deficit, it is useful to compare the cumulative rainfall recorded this year with that for the same period last year.

In fact, the autumn and winter seasons in 1986-1987 were characterized by rainfall in excess of normal over almost all of the country, resulting in the performance reported in terms of farm income, that from grain in particular.

It nonetheless remains true that the rainfall reported last year was not 100 percent profitable. The fact is that the Nabeul and Tunis regions suffered harshly from excessive precipitation, so much so that they were designated catastrophe areas following the torrential rains in September 1986.

According to Mr Hamadi Trabelsi, the Tunisian climate is characterized by this phenomenon of unusual rainfall.

The southeastern region has benefited greatly this year, in which the volume of rainfall recorded has sometimes been double what should have fallen, in particular in Beni Guerdane, Medenine and Gabes, the areas most favored.

If we go back in history, we will find that Tunisia has in the past experienced years in which there were particularly disastrous rainfall deficits. These were, in fact, the years 1911, 1914, 1922, 1935, 1943, 1948, 1956 and 1961, when unprecedented shortages of rainfall occurred. The resulting effects were excessively damaging to farm production in the country, and consequently, to other related economic activities.

Alarming Impact on Agriculture

According to Mr Hamadi Trabelsi, the farm season is now threatened. For this year, "rainfall in the first 15 days of February was expected to offset the cumulative deficit in some degree, but the weather forecasts are still pointing to clear weather for all of the regions of the country for the coming week."

Mr Trabelsi noted that there is a close correlation between the autumn rainfall, the winter rainfall and the spring rainfall. This relationship is evidenced on the level of the profitability of farm income.

For example, in the 1982-1983 farm year, there was a rainy autumn and an excessively rainy winter, with only the spring showing a deficit, and the grain harvest did not exceed 9 million quintals.

Thus the winter and spring rains are decisive for the North, according to Mr Hamadi Trabelsi. However, for the central and southern regions of the country, only the winter rains are a determining factor.

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Continuity Stressed, Issues Discussed by Economic Minister

45190038c Tunis LE TEMPS in French 19 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] (TAP)—Monastir—Minister of Economy Slaheddine Ben Mbarek presided at a meeting of the Destourian Socialist Party here yesterday morning. During the meeting he said that the options of the country for political action in this new era are mainly characterized by change within continuity.

He noted that continuity lies in safeguarding the foundations of the modern and balanced state, while change involves the constant renewal of methods of work in order to adapt them to economic changes and the demands of progress.

He announced that the next meeting of the Central Committee of the PSD will be devoted to a study of the suggestions made by the specialized commissions for the perfecting of a party charter and the development of party choices and structures such as to adapt them to the aspirations of the young people and society in general, and so that the party can continue to assume its vanguard role in the organization of the political, economic and social life of the country and consolidating the leading place Tunisian occupies on the level of the Arab world and internationally.

The minister explained that there is no question of authorizing the establishment of an Islamic party in a country in which the Muslim religion is the very foundation of society, of faith, of civilization and of history.

On the subject of the economic situation, Mr Ben Mbarek asserted the commitment of the president of the republic and the government to following up the implementation of the measures adopted to achieve the established goals where the economic development plans and the creation of jobs are concerned.

The minister explained that there can be no solution to the problem of employment and the various developmental issues without the reestablishment of confidence in the circles of promoters and investors in various categories. He noted that the recent tax amnesty measures fall within the framework of this orientation.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Funds Go To Palestinian Uprising

Umm al Qaywayni Workers To Donate Day's Pay
44000051 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 8 Mar 88 p 2

[Text] The committee that was formed by the order of His Highness Shaykh Rashid bin Ahmad al-Mu'allla, member of the Supreme Council and ruler of Umm al Qaywayn, to support the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territory held its first meeting yesterday morning headed by Shaykh Nasir bin Rashid al-Mu'allla. During the meeting, a discussion took place on practical ways of supporting the uprising. Also, approval was reached on a preliminary plan of action which included the deduction of a day's pay from the total salary of employees and workers in the emirate of Umm al Qaywayn on a one-time basis. The option to give additional amounts of support was left open to each individual.

Also, an executive sub-committee, headed by Rashid al-Kashf, was formed to overlook donations from organizations, private companies, commercial stores, and school students. Its members are Ahmad bin Rabi'ah, Sa'id Salamat, and 'Ali Jasim. In its meeting, the committee decided that banks with branches operating in the

emirate of Umm al Qaywayn are to pay an amount of no less than 10,000 dirhams per branch as a contribution. It also decided to have the Palestinian flag flown at the front of all organizations, companies and commercial stores in the emirate. In addition, an account number (1333) was opened in the National Bank of Umm al Qaywayn for depositing the support funds.

AL-BAYAN learned that the support committee for the uprising in its upcoming meeting to be held during the next few days will discuss other suggestions to guarantee the continuation of the uprising. They consist of the following:

—A deduction of five percent from the wages of all Palestinians working in the emirate of Umm al Qaywayn.

—The collection of a sum of 100 dirhams for every visa issued by the Immigration and Passport Office.

—The collection of 100 dirhams at the issuance and renewal of all trade licenses.

—The collection of 10 dirhams for every travel ticket.

—The collection of 10 dirhams from the renewal and issuance of automobile titles.

Bank of Umm al Qaywayn Donates Funds *44000051 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 8 Mar 88 p 2*

[Text] The National Bank of Umm al Qaywayn donated 10,000 dirhams yesterday to the cause of the uprising of the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied Arab territories.

Shaykh Nasir bin Rashid al-Mu'alla, appointed member of the board of directors and president of the bank, made the announcement. At the beginning of the meeting held by the support committee for the uprising which he heads in Umm al Qaywayn, Shaykh Nasir bin Rashid al-Mu'alla said that the bank opened the committee's account under the number 1333 with the sum of money which it had donated before the meeting.

/9738

Officials Welcome Economic Cooperation With Egypt *Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 15 Mar 88 p 2*

[Text] Two members of the United Arab Emirates delegation participating in the activities of the Arab investment conference that opened in Cairo the day before yesterday welcomed the opportunities for investment available in Egypt and the projects that the conference discussed for this purpose.

In a statement which the Egyptian Middle East News Agency disseminated yesterday, Sa'id al-'Utaybah, the President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Union of Abu Dhabi, said that convening the conference during the visit to Cairo of Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, president of the Emirates, will have a major effect on the businessmen and investors in the Emirates. These businessmen and investors have emphasized their desire to participate with Egyptian businessmen in the undertaking of projects in Egypt. In a similar statement, Muhammad Jasim, the deputy minister of agriculture of the Emirates and member of the delegation participating in the conference, called for coordination and cooperation between the countries of the GCC and Egypt as well as increased investment in them.

Jasim called for concentration on agricultural investment which he described as being the projects most commensurate with the needs of the Arab nations.

The Organization of Egyptian Investment had prepared 79 projects to discuss in the conference. The cost of the projects totaled about 4.5 billion Egyptian pounds.

Egyptian Exports to Abu Dhabi Increase

44040156c Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 15 Mar 88 p 2

[Text] Abu Dhabi—The total value of Egyptian commodity exports to Abu Dhabi rose from nearly 10.4 million dirhams in 1982 to 15.9 million dirhams in 1986. This is out of total Arab exports to Abu Dhabi of 966.5 million dirhams and 825.8 million dirhams in the same two years.

On the other hand, the total value of goods reexported by Abu Dhabi to Egypt rose from 15.5 million dirhams in 1982 to 30.2 millions and 30.3 million successively in 1983 and 1984. These reexports then decreased to 26.5 million dirhams and 20.7 million dirhams successively in 1985 and 1986.

During this period, the trade balance showed a surplus in favor of Abu Dhabi. This surplus rose from 5 million dirhams in 1982 to 17.3 million dirhams in 1983 and then dropped to 16.5 million dirhams in 1984 and to 13.8 millions in 1987. The surplus dropped to its lowest level, 4.8 million dirhams, in 1986.

The above figures appear in a study prepared by the Economic Studies and Research Office of the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the development of trade between the Emirate and Egypt.

The study stresses that Egypt has occupied a prominent place among the Arab countries which have economic and trade relations with Egypt. Trade relations have also played a pioneer role in strengthening the bonds of fraternal friendship between the two sides.

08494

**Defense Minister Meets With Omani Officials,
Discusses Cooperation**

44040156b *Dubayy AL-BAYAN* in Arabic
15 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by Walid al-'Aridah]

[Excerpt] Muscat—His Highness Shaykh Muhammad ibn Rashid al-Maktum, the minister of defense, met in Muscat yesterday evening with His Highness Fahr ibn Taymur al-Busa'idi, the Omani deputy prime minister for security and defense affairs, at the latter's office in Bayt al-Falj.

A number of issues that fall within the framework of consultation, cooperation and coordination between the two countries, especially at the military level, were discussed at the meeting.

The meeting was attended by Shaykh Hashr ibn Maktum al-Maktum, director of the Dubayy Information Department; Brig Gen Shaykh Batti ibn Maktum al-Maktum, the central military region's deputy commander for supply and management; and Shaykh Ahmad ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, director of the Dubayy Civil Aviation Department.

At noon yesterday, His Highness Shaykh Muhammad ibn Rashid al-Maktum, the minister of defense, met with His Excellency al-Mu'tasim ibn Hammud al-Busa'idi, the Omani minister of state for defense affairs, at the latter's office in the Omani Ministry of Defense premises in Muscat. At the meeting, views were exchanged on a number of issues connected with the latest developments in the area's situation. The meeting also discussed the means to bolster military cooperation between the UAE and the Sultanate of Oman within the framework of the cooperation and coordination existing between the GCC member states.

This meeting was attended by Shaykh Hashr ibn Maktum al-Maktum, Brig Gen Batti ibn Maktum al-Maktum and Shaykh Ahmad ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, director of the Dubayy Civil Aviation Department. On the Omani side, Staff Lt Gen Hamid ibn Sa'id al-'Awfi, the chief of staff of the Oman armed forces, the commander of the Omani air force and a number of high-ranking officers attended the meeting.

08494

Arab Investment Abroad Discussed

44040156a *Kuwait AL-WATAN* in Arabic 27 Feb 88 p 8

[Text] 'Abd-al-Malik al-Humr, the UAE Central Bank governor, has asserted that the assets of the Arab funds invested abroad currently exceed \$200 billions, adding that they were even greater in the late 1970's but that they have been eroded and have decreased to their current level as a result of the international investment climate. Published data also confirm that Arab funds smuggled from the Arab homeland by individuals amount to no less than \$800 millions monthly.

The governor urged that Arab resources be trained to invest Arab funds and to manage Arab institutions under in light of the steadily improving investment climate being currently experienced by the Arab homeland, noting that those who do not want the money do not own it and that what is needed in the coming phase is good banking preparation to restore some of the Arab investments existing abroad.

Meeting To Discuss Future of Investments

In the period from 29-31 March 1988, the Arab Banks Union will hold a banking meeting in Lebanon to discuss the future of Arab investments abroad. The meeting will be attended by chairmen of the boards of directors and by the general managers of Arab banks and central institutions.

Dr 'Adnan al-Hindi, the union's secretary general who is currently visiting the UAE, has said that the meeting seeks to expose the risks of investment abroad, the causes for the emigration of Arab funds, the dangers of exchange rates, inflation, confiscation, petroleum, interest rates, the means to improve the investment and protection of Arab funds and to enhance the investment climate in the Arab homeland to attract the largest possible amount of Arab investments. The meeting will also explain the role of the Arab banks and financial institutions operating abroad.

The banking meeting will further discuss the reasons for the emigration of Arab funds and the volume, directions and uses of such funds abroad. It will also discuss the role of the offshore units and the cash and commodity trade and will review the experiences of some Arab banks, funds and financial institutions in foreign investment. Moreover, the meeting will discuss modern investment approaches, alternatives and the risks emanating from market and currency fluctuations and from portfolio management and the importance of the information revolution in pursuing the channels of ideal investment.

08494

BANGLADESH

Press Demands Repatriation of Pakistanis
BK071504 Dhaka SANGBAD in Bengali 31 Mar 88 p 4

[Editorial: "How Much Longer Will They Be Carried on the Shoulders of Others?"]

[Text] It is because of the adamant and unreasonable role of the Islamabad authorities that more than 250,000 stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh have been unable to return 'home' even after 17 years. At the same time, Bangladesh has been unable to rid itself of the burden of looking after a huge number of foreign nationals for such a long time.

We should not have to be bothered with the difficulties, allegations or problems of the Pakistani nationals. Their struggles should take place in Karachi, Lahore or Islamabad. However, the hunger strikes and demonstrations of the Pakistani nationals against these problems are being staged in Dhaka. Therefore, even though it is not our problem, we are the unwitting victims.

A citizen of any country has the right to go back to his own home and settle down there. No one can be barred from this right. It is also the duty of each nation to repatriate its own when they get stranded elsewhere.

The stranded Pakistani nationals in Bangladesh have rightfully demanded that they should be allowed to return to their own country. Therefore, their movement, which is drawing the attention of everyone, cannot be described as unjust. However, the responsibility for taking them back lies with Pakistan; Bangladesh is only anxiously waiting to free itself from this burden. Bangladesh wants Pakistan to fulfill its responsibility and obligation in this regard. It is the moral and legal responsibility of Pakistan to repatriate all its nationals from Bangladesh.

By not repatriating the stranded citizens, the Pakistan Government is not only doing an injustice toward them but is also hurting Bangladesh financially. The international aid received for these people is by no means adequate and the Bangladesh Government has to spend substantial amounts toward the relief work. Moreover, many of these stranded people work for a living in different fields in Bangladesh and thereby deny employment opportunities to the local population. Bangladesh is already a highly populous nation and in such a situation the presence of about 300,000 foreigners has become an additional burden.

It is better not to raise the role played by these stranded Pakistanis in 1971 [war of liberation]. But the question arises as to why and for how long the nation will have to carry the burden of these people who, even though they have lived here for generations, have never accepted it as their own nation? Given Pakistan's procrastinating tactics, the government should take the initiative for a serious dialogue with the Islamabad authorities on this issue.

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